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Monetary and Fiscal Policies:
Ordinary Recessions and Financial Crises
Svetoslav Semov
Abstract
This paper uses two different samples to study the effects of monetary and fiscal
policies on the profiles of recessions and recoveries. Several results emerge
from the econometric analysis presented. First, monetary policy during ordinary
recessions and banking crises is a powerful tool with lasting effects that extend
to recovery growth rates. However, the effect of monetary policy during financial
crises is strongly diminished in the case of forbearance – banks left to function
despite being technically insolvent. Second, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is
reversed – it is a powerful tool during banking crises, but it does not seem to
significantly affect recovery growth rates during ordinary recessions. Finally,
the policy response during past financial crisis does not seem to be particularly
expansionary – on the contrary, fiscal policy is markedly procylcical, while
monetary policy is neutral. This is proposed as an alternative explanation to the
one usually given for the sluggishness of financial crises.
I.

Introduction
The Global Recession of 2008-09 sparked renewed interest in systemic

financial crises. A key observation, first documented by Kaminsky and Reinhart,
was that recessions associated with financial crises turn out to be particularly severe
and protracted (1999). Most of the work on financial crises has concentrated on
real-economy variables like output loss, length, depth etc. (Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009; Kannan, 2010; Claessens et al., 2004). The role of monetary and fiscal
policies in financial crises has not been extensively studied with the exception
of a 15-country study in the latest issue of the World Economic Outlook (IMF,
2009). It is possible that inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies are one
reason why recoveries associated with financial crises turn out to be particularly
severe. In addition, it might be that in those cases in which monetary policy was
appropriately used, its effectiveness was diminished because the monetary policy
transmission mechanism was impaired as a result of the stress in the banking
system (IMF, 2009a).
5

This paper attempts to empirically evaluate the effect of monetary and
fiscal policies in financial crises on the duration of the recession and the strength
of the recovery. It further tries to examine if the effectiveness of monetary policy is
dependent on the implementation of financial reforms. As a benchmark, recessions
are employed to evaluate the normal impact of monetary and fiscal policies on
recovery growth rates. Several results emerge from the econometric analysis
presented. First, expansionary monetary policy during ordinary recessions is a
powerful tool with lasting effects that extend to recovery growth rates. However,
fiscal policy does not seem to affect post-crisis growth. Second, expansionary
monetary policy during financial crises still has a positive but insignificant effect
on the strength of the recovery, while expansionary fiscal policy has a positive
and significant effect. Furthermore, these results are preserved in the analysis of
the duration of the recession. Some empirical evidence is provided that explains
the ineffectiveness of monetary policy by numerous cases of forbearance –
banks left to function despite being technically insolvent. Finally, fiscal policy in
financial crises seems to be markedly procyclical – the authorities cut government
consumption on average by 2.5 percent of GDP during the duration of the
downturn. Monetary policy, on the other hand, seems to be countercyclical – real
money market rates are decreased on average by once percent during the duration
of the downturn.
Two different samples are used. The first one uses quarterly data for a set
of seventy crises in nineteen developed countries to analyze the effect of the policy
response on the duration of the downturn and recovery growth rates. The second
one employs yearly data for a set of eighty financial crises episodes in different
countries to do the same. In addition, the impact of forbearance on monetary policy
is also estimated. In both cases, the goal is to use the variation in policy responses
and outcomes to find out the relationship between the variables of interest.
6

Eight sections follow. Section II reviews other cross country studies that
examine the profiles of recessions and recoveries associated with financial crises.
Section III presents a graphical interpretation of a linearized New Keynesian
model with a risk premium. Within this framework, I explain the difference
between financial crises and ordinary recessions. Furthermore, I illustrate the
importance of monetary and fiscal policy. In addition, in Section III, I provide
a concise analysis of the policy response in twelve financial crises and I argue
that non-Keynesian policies are the norm rather than the exception. Section IV
specifies the econometric model to be used. In addition, it discusses alternative
versions of the model that should be estimated to check for the robustness of
results. Section V describes the data, on which the analysis will be based and its
sources. Section VI presents evidence on the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal
policies in both ordinary recessions and financial crises and discusses the role of
forbearance on monetary policy effectiveness. Finally, Section VII concludes and
summarizes the results.
II.

Literature Review
This paper will attempt to add to the literature on cross-country studies of

financial countries. Most studies examining recoveries and recessions associated
with financial crises look at outcomes (output loss, duration of recession,
sluggishness of recovery) without explicitly answering the question what it is
that causes financial crises to be such protracted affairs. In addition, they do not
include the policy response in the analysis.
For example, Reinhart and Rogoff conduct a comparative historical analysis
of the aftermath of systemic financial crises (2008). The countries under
consideration are both developed and emerging economies that have experienced
financial distress in the after-war period. Reinhart and Rogoff’s analysis shows
7

deep and lasting effects on output and employment. Unemployment rises for
five years and output declines last on average for two years following the peak
of economic growth. This is substantially more than the length observed during
“normal recessions”. However, the authors do not provide any explanations for
why this might be the case. Their analysis is merely comparative.
Boysen-Hogrefe et al. use a parametric framework to test whether the size
of the bounce-back of GDP following an ordinary recession is larger than that
following a recession associated with a banking crisis or housing crisis. The study
covers 16 industrialized countries from 1970 to 2006. The results indicate that
the output loss during an ordinary recession is completely offset in the following
recovery. This is not the case when the recession was triggered by a banking crisis
or a housing crisis. Again, this study does not offer explanations for why this
might be the case – it simply makes this observation.
Kannan offers one possible reason why recoveries from banking crises
might be more protracted (2010). Using a sample of 21 industrialized economies
from 1970 to 2004, the author documents that it takes 5 ½ quarters for output to
recover following a banking crises, while it takes only 3 quarters following a normal
recession. Evidence is presented that stressed credit conditions are an important
factor containing the pace of the recovery. Industries that are more reliant on external
finance, or more subject to financial frictions, are found not to recover as fast as
other industries following all kinds of recession. The author finds strong evidence
that the differential growth patterns across industries is much more pronounced in
the aftermath of a financial crisis than it is for other recessions.
One potential drawback of this study is the small sample. The author
relies on just 15 financial crisis episodes, not all of which are systemic.
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There is another strand of literature that attempts to explain why some
financial crises are so prolonged. This strand analyzes the effect of financial
policies on the depth and duration of recessions. For example, Cecchetti et al.
explore a vast array of financial policies (liquidity support, deposit freeze, blanket
guarantee, bank holiday, forbearance etc.) and find that establishing an asset
management company is associated with shorter recessions (2009). Furthermore,
the authors find that forbearance is strongly associated with bigger output losses.
Other financial policies do not seem to have a significant effect on length, depth
and cumulative output losses during recessions associated with financial crises.
Also, Claessens et al. find that that excessive fiscal outlays delay economic
recovery.The fiscal outlay figure includes both fiscal and quasi-fiscal outlays for
financial system restructuring, including the recapitalization costs for banks, bailout
costs related to the government covering obligations due to depositors and creditors,
and debt relief schemes for bank borrowers. Furthermore, better institutional
framework, as characterized by less corruption and greater judicial efficiency, does
reduce output losses, even when controlling for excessive fiscal outlays.
In summary, the literature on financial policies might explain why some
financial crises are so prolonged – if they were not followed by the implementation
of the appropriate financial system reforms.
In addition, there is another reason financial crises might turn out to be
more sluggish than ordinary recessions – if monetary and fiscal policies were not
appropriately used. The effect of monetary and fiscal policies is explored in the
most recent World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2009). The authors find that monetary
and fiscal policies tend to shorten the duration of all types of recessions. Both
increases in government consumption and decreases of interest rates beyond what
is warranted by a Taylor rule positively and significantly affect recovery growth
9

rates. However, when only financial crises are analyzed the effect of monetary
policy is found not to be statistically significant. One drawback of this study is
that the sample for banking crises is limited to only fifteen episodes in developed
countries. This study is also related to the literature on the monetary policy
transmission mechanism. If the transmission mechanism is affected, then the
way monetary policy works could also be influenced. For example, the interestrate and the bank-lending channels could be hampered by the stress experienced
by the financial system, something that might lead to reduced effectiveness of
monetary policy (IMF, 2009a).
This paper attempts to add to the discussion of the sluggishness of
financial crises. It will build on previous work on the effects of monetary and
fiscal policies during banking crises (IMF, 2009). In particular, a larger sample
than used before will be employed to test whether the strength of the recovery and
the duration of the recession are affected by the policy response. In addition, the
impact of monetary policy will be examined in cases of forbearance. If the lack
of financial reforms proves to change the effectiveness of monetary policy, then
this might give another explanation why some countries take so long to recover
following a banking crisis. Finally, the extent to which fiscal and monetary
policies have been used in past financial crises is documented.
III.

Financial Crises and Past Policy Responses
Various studies analyze the link between the financial sector and the real

economy (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke and Gertler, 2000; Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997). In this section, I review some of the existing literature that explains
how the financial sector can amplify output shocks, making a recession deeper
and more prolonged. Furthermore, I use a graphical version of a linearized
New Keynesian model that incorporates a risk premium and demonstrates the
10

difference between financial crises and ordinary recessions. Finally, I propose an
alternative explanation for the severity of financial crises – the policy response.
I argue that financial crises are often a time of immense political and economic
turmoil, something that often leads to the pursuit of non-Keynesian policies. In
addition to providing some possible explanations for the contractionary policies
countries have undertaken during financial crises, I review, in detail, the policy
response in twelve systemic banking crises. The episodes discussed suggest that
both developed and developing countries have pursued non-Keynesian policies
in the past.

Financial Crises: Why are They Different from Ordinary Recessions?
Some evidence has been found for Milton Friedman’s “plucking model”
which says that cyclical contractions tend to dissipate more quickly the larger the
size of the contraction (Sinclair, 2005). However, financial crises do not seem
to follow this pattern. They serve as an amplification mechanism that magnifies
and accompanies other types of shocks like exchange rate, domestic and foreign
debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). An essential part of this amplification
mechanism is the asymmetric information problems that arise during a financial
crisis (Bernanke, 1983). Bernanke claims that the loss of confidence in financial
institutions and the widespread insolvency of debtors lead to increased cost of
credit intermediation, because banks cannot differentiate between good and bad
borrowers. Consequently, potential worthy borrowers cannot undertake their
projects; also savers have to devote their funds to inferior uses. As a result, there
is a contraction in economic activity.
Bernanke and Gertler (2000) formulated a formal model that explains
how the financial system serves as an amplification mechanism to negative shocks
that hit the economy. The initial output shock leads to a decrease in wealth, which
11

makes firms more dependent on external financing. A weak banking system
cannot provide that financing, leading to a decline in investment. Kiyotaki and
Moore trace a similar dynamic in a richer intertemporal model (1997). A collapse
in land prices undermines a firm’s collateral, something that decreases its credit
limit. This causes it to pull back investment in assets and hurts it even more in the
next period.
The dynamics described above can be analyzed within an otherwise
standard New Keynesian model that includes a risk premium. The model has the
following equations (Clarida et al., 1999):
AS:

π –Et πt+1 = α(Yt –Ytn) + ut

IS:

Yt –Ytn = –γ[it-Et πt+1]+Et (Yt+1 –Ytn+1)+gt

TS:

r = f –Et πt+1+σ
This is a linearized version of a New Keynesian model (Clarida et al.,

1999). The AS curve is derived from the Euler equation of firms. It is referred to
as the New Keynesian Phillips curve. It shows a positive relationship between
prices and output, because an increase in output leads to higher real marginal
costs, which in turn make firms increase their prices. The parameters π, πe, Yt, Ytn
represent inflation, expected inflation, output and the natural level of output (the
level that will arise if prices are perfectly flexible). The parameter α refers to the
fraction of sticky-price firms. The larger this fraction is, the flatter the AS curve, and
correspondingly, the smaller change in price level economic fluctuations produce.
The last term of the AS curve, ut , is referred to as “cost push”, i.e. anything else
that might affect marginal costs. In addition, it is a random disturbance term that
follows an autoregressive pattern.
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The IS curve is derived from the consumption Euler equations of
households, that is the household’s optimal saving decision. In this equation the
current output gap depends on expected future output, Et (Yt+1–Ytn+1), and the
real interest rate – (it-Et πt+1). Higher expected future output raises the current
output, because consumers want to smooth consumption, and, therefore, consume
more today. In addition, the negative effect of the real interest rate reflects the
intertemporal substitution of consumption. The last term of the IS curve, gt, is
a function of expected changes in government purchases relative to expected
changes to potential output. Since gt shifts the IS curve, it is interpretable as a
demand shock (Clarida et al., 1999). Also, gt is a random disturbance term that
follows an autoregressive pattern.
Finally, the TS curve links the real risky rate, r, and the federal funds
rate, f. The parameter σ is the risk premium. Although, the optimization of the
monetary authority’s loss function is not a part of the model, it implicitly enters the
selection of the appropriate level of the federal funds rate f. The Fed’s stabilizing
policy rule makes it offset shocks to the risk premium or to expected inflation.
Recessions associated with financial crises can be analyzed within this
model. More importantly, the difference between those recessions and “ordinary”
recessions can be illustrated. In the model normal recessions are usually caused
by a leftward shift in the IS curve – a demand shock. For example, the demand
shock in the financial crisis of 2008 was the collapse of the housing market that
caused residential investment and consumption to fall. During times of financial
distress there is an additional factor at play – the risk/liquidity premium σ. A
jump in its value shifts the TS curve up, raising real interest rates on corporate
bonds, mortgages, and other risky assets. This is consistent with Bernanke’s
claim that higher cost of credit intermediation leads to increased interest rates
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or to a curtailment of credit (1983). In the model, the increased interest rates are
represented by the risk premium. The shift of the TS curve is also consistent with
the lowering of borrowers’ credit limits in Kiyotaki’s model, something that also
leads to higher interest rates (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
For example, at the start of the financial crisis of 2008 there was an
uncertainty associated with the solvency of various financial institutions. Also,
there was a huge fire sale of risky assets in an effort to raise cash. Such events
cause the TS curve to go up (the movement of the curve could be observed in the
equations above – as σ increases, r rises as well). An upward shift in the TS curve
leads in turn to a decrease in investment and consumption, causing output to fall

even further (illustrated by an upward movement along the IS curve). The graphs
fall even further (illustrated by an upward movement along the IS curve). The graphs b
below illustrate these dynamics:

illustrate these dynamics:
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recessions. In cases of financial distress, there is an additional force, illustrated in step (2), w

In step (1) the economy is undergoing a demand shock often responsible
for ordinary recessions. In cases of financial distress, there is an additional force,
illustrated in step (2), which is exacerbating the recession.
This model can be further used to illustrate how the policy response
can add to the severity of a financial crisis. Expansionary monetary policy is
represented by downward movements along the TS curve (the Fed optimizes
its loss function, choosing the appropriate level of f), which lead to downward
movements along the IS curve and correspondingly to higher output. Fiscal policy
acts through the IS curve – an increase in government spending shifts the IS
curve to the right, leading to an increase in output. Unconventional policies, like
measures to calm down financial markets, go through the TS curve. For example,
stress tests of the banking system lead to a decrease in σ, the risk premium, and
a downward shift of the TS curve. Also, quantitative easing can target the term
premium and also shift down the TS curve.
The model specified above is useful for distinguishing between financial
crises and ordinary recessions. Furthermore, it illustrates the possible impact
of monetary and fiscal policies. However, it does not differentiate between the
effectiveness of these policies in different environments. For example, Gali (2005)
and Eggertsson and Krugman (2010) demonstrate within a New Keynesian model
with heterogeneous agents that during times of financial crises the number of
credit constrained agents increases. As a result, government spending is effective
in raising the disposal income of those agents, something that makes them spend
more. In other words, these studies imply that fiscal policy might be more effective
during times of financial crises.
In addition, monetary policy might also have different effectiveness in
various environments. For example, if the transmission mechanism is affected
15

during a financial crisis, then the way monetary policy works might change.
The interest-rate and the bank-lending channels could be damaged by the stress
experienced in the financial system. (IMF, 2009a). Furthermore, if the economy
is in a liquidity trap, as during Japan’s 1997 recession, then traditional monetary
policy instruments are also not as effective as they would be under normal
circumstances.
Why is the Recovery Slow?
The recovery from a financial crisis is slower than that from an ordinary recession
for similar reasons. As Bernanke argues, it takes time to establish new or revive
old channels of credit (1983). Furthermore, it takes time to rehabilitate borrowers.
This last idea is further developed by Koo (2009). He argues that financial crises
are usually connected to “balance sheet” recessions. The last can result from a
shock to balance sheets – for example, a bubble burst – that often accompanies
financial crises. Then, it takes time for households and businesses to repair their
balance sheets. For example, Japan’s recovery during the “lost decade” was
prolonged as a result of an overhang of corporate debt. Similarly, an overhang of
household debt is probably holding down U.S. economic growth right now.
Why has the Policy Response in Past Financial Crises not been Keynesian?
The divergent policy responses to financial crises have their basis in the
fundamental theoretical disagreement about the effects of stabilization policies
that exists in the economic profession. Starting in the 1970s there was a shift in
economic thinking led in part by Edward Prescott that resulted in the formation of
New Classical economics. A main part of this shift was the idea that activist policies
to fight the business cycle are undesirable. This was because recessions result
from the rational decision of workers to work less when the economic conditions
are less favorable and, therefore, are the natural course of events. However, there
16

were still economists who believed that recessions are caused by demand side of
the economy – the New Keynesians. They worked to incorporate enough frictions
into the Real Business Cycle models of New Classical economists so that they can
bring the two camps closer together.
As Krugman argues, during the period 1980 – 2007 the clash between
the New Keynesians and New Classical economists was mainly on the basis of
theory and not action, because in the U.S. there was not much need to implement
expansionary policies, since recessions were relatively mild over that period. New
Keynesians thought that monetary policy was sufficient in managing the business
cycle. In contrast, New Classical economists thought that both expansionary fiscal
and monetary policy are ineffective, but did not mind the use of monetary policy.
A case in point of why disagreements in the economics profession matter
for policy is the recent global financial crisis. Farell (2011) argues that there were
noticeable shifts in the policy debate and implementation in the U.S. starting in
early 2010 that are attributable to the sovereign debt crises of Iceland and the
Baltic states. In particular, these crises provided conservative policy makers the
rhetorical fodder in the debate for more stringent fiscal policy. The intellectual
support those policy makers needed was, in turn, sought from economists; and the
disunited profession had what to offer. At the time various prominent economists
put forward arguments against further extending the stimulus. Examples of such
arguments are the work of Alesina and Ardagna (2010) supporting expansionary
austerity and the work of Rogoff and Reinhart (2009) on admissible government
debt thresholds.
In addition to the theoretical divide responsible for different approaches
crisis countries have undertaken in the past, there are some attractive beliefs
among policy makers that make them pursue non-Keynesian policies in the face
17

of financial and economic turmoil. For example, such a belief is the seemingly
logical argument that problems of excessive debt, too much private borrowing,
cannot be solved by creating even more of it – government borrowing (Krugman
and Eggertsson, 2010). During the Asian Financial Crisis the IMF advised some
of the crisis-stricken countries to pursue contractionary fiscal policies following
a similar argument. The intention was to “restore confidence” by convincing the
markets that irresponsible behavior is a thing of the past. For similar reasons,
money market rates were increased and unnecessary structural reforms were
undertaken (Krugman, 2010). Tightened monetary policy was aimed at convincing
the markets that the pegged exchange system will be preserved. Some of the
structural reforms had no particular connection to the crisis but they were also
aimed at calming down the markets. A typical example of IMF-advised policies
was what Korea did in 1997. Money market rates were raised up to 25.6 percent
in M1, 1998. Furthermore, there was an initial tightening of fiscal polcy to rebuild
confidence (for half a year).
Furthermore, there might be institutional reasons for some countries’
inability to pursue Keynesian policies – Kaminsky et al. argue that developing
countries face credit constraints during bad times that prevent them from borrowing
(2004). Furthermore, developing countries tend to also follow procyclical policies
during good times, meaning that they do not have the necessary cushion to fight
recessions.
Advanced countries are not immune to institutional problems. Central
banks in some developed countries have become increasingly conservative
in the past two decades, focusing too much on inflation, and this might have its
consequences during severe recessions (Krugman, 2010). A recent IMF study of 25
severe recessions in advanced economies finds that prolonged periods of economic
weakness are associated with falling inflation rates (Meier, 2010). However, it also
18

finds that as the inflation rate goes toward zero, it becomes sticky. This means that
a severely depressed economy can still have a positive inflation rate – most likely
because of downward nominal rigidities and well-anchored inflation expectations.
A central bank that is overly focused on inflation might miss the urgency of the
situation and not act as aggressive as necessary (Krugman, 2010).
Finally, there is an additional reason why some countries cannot further
stimulate a depressed economy – the liquidity trap. Such an environment was
observed in Japan in the 1990s and is currently the reality in U.S.

IV.

Modeling
The effect of monetary policy during recessions on the ensuing recoveries is

first analyzed on the background of countries, experiencing “ordinary” recessions.
This is meant to serve as a benchmark. Then, the effect of monetary policy is
analyzed in countries undergoing banking crises.
Monetary Policy in Ordinary Recessions
The goal is to see if recovery growth rates after ordinary recessions
are significantly affected by monetary policies. For that purpose a fixed effects
model is used (IMF, 2009a). The reason for this is to capture the effect of any
unobservable country-level characteristics that pertain to the recessions and
recoveries experienced. For example, a country with an export-oriented economy
might be able to faster drag itself out of a recession. Such an occurrence would
be captured by the fixed-effects model assuming that throughout the period under
consideration the export industry has held a similar role. In particular, the model
estimated is:
RecGrowthi ,t= c0+c1*Amplitudei ,t + c2*Durationi ,t + c3*MPi ,t+ c4*CAGCi ,t+ + ei ,t (1)

19

The dependent variable is the recovery growth rate one year after the
trough of the recession. I control for the amplitude and duration of the recession
– these are characteristics of the business cycle itself that might differ within
a certain country over time. For example, there is nothing to make us believe
that external shocks which hit an economy should be of the same size. Milton
Friedman’s “plucking model”, which has been empirically verified, suggests
that the coefficient estimate on Amplitude, c1, should be positive – the deeper
the recession, the stronger the recovery. Furthermore, I expect that prolonged
recessions have slower recoveries. As a result, the coefficient estimate on
Duration, c2, is conjectured to be negative. Duration is measured in quarters.
The monetary policy response over the recession period, the variable
MP, is measured as the sum of the residuals of a monetary policy rule over each
quarter over the recession period. I expect that countries that increased interest
rates above what is warranted by a Taylor rule experienced slower recoveries. As
a results, the coefficient estimate on MP, c3 ,is conjectured to be negative.
As mentioned, monetary policy shocks are identified from the residuals
of a monetary policy rule. For that purpose, following the methodology of the
latest issue of the World Economic Outlook, a Taylor rule of the following form
was estimated for each country:
it=b0+b1*dummy_85+ b2*πt+ b3*gapt+ ut,
where it is the nominal interest rate, dummy_85 is a dummy for periods after 1985
(to allow for a shift in equilibrium rates), πt is the inflation rate and gapt is a
measure of the output gap (potential GDP is measured using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter). Using the real interest rate as the dependent variable does not change the
results, since inflation is included in the model.
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The fiscal policy response over the recession period, the variable CAGC, is
cyclically adjusted government consumption. I expect that an increase in this variable
will lead to a higher growth rate of the recovery. Therefore, c4should be positive.
Again, the methodology of the World Economic Outlook is used. First, the elasticity
of government consumption with respect to the business cycle is estimated:
lngct=d0+d1*gapt+ d2*trend+ et.
As above, gapt is a measure of the output gap. Trend is a time trend. Second, the
cyclically adjusted government consumption is computed as:
CAGCt=gct(1-d1*gapt).
In addition to the above estimations, a check for the robustness of the results
is performed. The duration of the recession is used as dependent variables in some of
the estimations to see if the effects of the monetary and fiscal policies change.
Monetary Policy in Financial Crises
The effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the duration of the
recession and the strength of the recovery following financial crises are analyzed.
In addition, monetary policy is examined in cases of forbearance - banks left to
function despite being technically insolvent, and prudential regulations (such as
for loan classification and loan loss provisioning) suspended or not fully applied.
If forbearance has a negative effect on the effectiveness of monetary policy, then
insufficient use and diminished effectiveness of an otherwise powerful tool for
stimulating recoveries might be responsible for the sluggishness of some financial
crisis episodes. Data for forbearance is available only for about thirty five countries
(Laeven and Valencia, 2010), while the sample of all financial crises includes
about eighty countries. Consequently, two different estimations are performed.
The model that includes forbearance is:
R e c G ro w t h = c 0 + c 1 * A m p l i t u d e + c 2 * D u r a t i o n + c 3 * M P + c 4 * M P F o r b +
c5*Forbearance + c6*GDP(-1) + e (2)
21

The variables RecGrowth, Amplitude, and Duration are the selfexplanatory. They are measured as the recovery growth rate one year after the
trough of the recession, the sum of GDP growth rates during the recession, and
the duration of the recession in quarters.
Monetary policy is measured as the change in real money market rates
over the course of the recession. If money market rates are not available, then their
closest substitute is used. The reason for the difference from before is the usage
of yearly data. Estimating residuals from a Taylor rule would be too imprecise
with yearly data. A decrease in interest rates would mean that there is a negative
change in real money market rates. Therefore, we are testing if c3, the coefficient
estimate on the monetary policy measure, is negative. Note that the dependent
variable is the growth rate, or the output gap, in the recovery phase, which is at
least one year after the implementation of monetary policies; this would eliminate
any endogeneity problems.
In addition to the measure for monetary policy, the regression equation
includes an interaction term between the changes in real interest rates and
forbearance. Forbearance is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not there
is regulatory forbearance during the years [t, t+3], where t denotes the starting
year of the crisis. This variable is based on a qualitative assessment of information
contained in IMF Staff Reports (Laeen and Valencia). As part of this assessment,
information is collected on whether or not banks were permitted to continue
functioning despite being technically insolvent, and whether or not prudential
regulations (such as for loan classification and loan loss provisioning) were
suspended or not fully applied during the first three years of the crisis.
The interaction term is supposed to estimate whether in cases of
forbearance the effect of monetary policy is reduced. Previous experience has
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suggested that this might be the case. For example, many observers consider the
policies undertaken by Sweden in the early 1990s to have been highly effective
in restoring the health of the financial system and paving the way for a strong
recovery through extensive use of expansionary policies (IMF, 2009). In contrast,
in Japan, slow recognition of the bad-loan problem contributed to a sluggish
recovery from the financial crisis, even though interest rates were at the zero
bound. The effectiveness of monetary policy might be disrupted if the interest
rate and credit channels of the monetary policy transmission mechanism are not
properly working during a banking crisis.
In other words, the coefficient estimate on MPForb is expected to be
positive. The marginal impact of MP is given by c3+c4*Forb. We expect that c3
would be negative. Therefore, if forbearance diminishes the effect of monetary
policy it should be making the whole term bigger (“less negative”). This would
mean that we are testing whether the coefficient estimate on MPForb, c4, is positive.
Finally, forbearance is also included in the model. We would expect that if
the authorities do not address and act on failing banking institutions, then this would
have a direct negative effect on the economy. However, it is not particularly clear
how long lasting this deleterious impact might be. Generally, we would expect that
recovery growth rates might be negatively affected by forbearance. Therefore, we
are testing to see if the coefficient estimate of Forbearance, c5, is negative.
The estimated model without forbearance would look like:
RecGrowth=c0+c1*Amplitude+c2*Duration+c3*MP+c4*GC+c5*GDP(-1)+e (3)

The definition of the variables is the same as above. The only difference
is that the government consumption variable is added. In particular, fiscal policy
is proxied by the percentage change in government consumption. This measure
is used instead of the fiscal balance, because the last would cause endogeneity. A
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change in output affects the fiscal balance (it is a fraction of output) and a change
in the fiscal balance affects output. An increase in government consumption
during the recession phase is expected to positively affect recovery growth
rates. Therefore, we are testing if c4, the coefficient estimate on the change in
government consumption, is positive.
In addition to the above estimations, a couple of robustness checks are
performed. The duration of the recession and the output gap one year after the end
of the recession are used as dependent variables.
Data
In getting a better understanding of the recovery that will follow the 2008-09
recession through the lenses of historical experience we have two choices. We can
either draw conclusions from the financial crises that occurred during the 1930s,
or look at the ones that have plagued the world in the past forty years. The reason
for this is the striking pattern of occurrence of financial crises worldwide. From
the 1940s up to the early 1970s, there were almost no banking crises in the world.1
However, with the financial and international capital account liberalization of the
1970s, banking crises have re-emerged (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a).
This paper focuses on the period 1970-2005 and it uses two distinct data sets.
The first one consists of data on recessions and recoveries in a set of advanced
countries. The countries are those identified in the Statistical Appendix of the
2010 issue of the World Economic Outlook as advanced. Then, subject to data
availability the monetary and fiscal policy responses during all of the recessions
since 1970 in the selected countries are analyzed. Quarterly data is used. To
1

Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) argue that this calm might be partly explained by booming world
growth, but perhaps more so by the repression of the domestic financial markets (in varying degrees) and the heavy-handed use of capital controls followed for many years after WWII.
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measure the stance of monetary and fiscal policies money market rates and
government consumption are employed. The main source of the data is the
International Financial Statistics database of the IMF. Given that only a few of the
countries have data going back before 1977 this limits the sample.
The procedure for identifying business cycles is an algorithm called BBQ
(Bry and Boschan procedure for quarterly data; see Harding and Pagan, 2002).
A MATLAB version of a program that imitates the algorithm can be found at
www.ncer.edu.au. It uses quarterly output data to identify peaks and troughs.
A complete cycle goes from one peak to the next peak with its two phases the
contraction phase (from peak to trough) and the expansion phase (from trough to
peak). The algorithm requires that the minimum duration of the complete cycle
and each phase must be at least five and two quarters, respectively. Table1 in the
appendix shows the recessions (peak-to-trough) identified by this algorithm.
The second dataset consists of eighty financial crisis episodes in both
developed and developing countries. Laeven and Valencia identify 124 systemic
banking crises between 1970 and 2007 (2008). Data on real GDP, inflation,
government consumption and interest rates is collected from the International
Financial Statistics database of the IMF. Eighty of the 124 crisis episodes had
output data available. Furthermore, of those eighty countries not all have both
government consumption and interest rates data available. As a result, the sample
is limited to less than eighty countries in the various regressions below. To measure
the stance of monetary and fiscal policy money market rates and government
consumption are used. Wherever money market rates are unavailable, their closest
substitute is used. Data on forbearance is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2010)
and it is limited to about 35 countries for which the authors provide information
on various financial policies undertaken. All data is yearly.
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Figures 1 and 2, in the appendix, describe the output dynamics and duration
of recessions associated with financial crises. Those recessions are particularly
severe – the amplitude of the recession is on average about four percent of real
GDP and the mean duration is about five quarters. In addition, seventy percent
of the crisis periods considered have a duration of one year or more. The policy
response in those crises is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Monetary policy, proxied
by the change in money market rates, seems to be expansionary – real interest
rates have declined during both the first year and the whole duration of the crisis.
However, these declines can be mainly explained by the inflationary dynamics in
the countries and not by the explicit behavior of policy makers. Figure 3 shows
that nominal interest rates have actually increased slightly. On the contrary, fiscal
policy, proxied by the change in government consumption, seems to be markedly
procyclical. Approximately one half of the crisis episodes were characterized by a
negative change in government consumption during the duration of the recession.
Note that government consumption data is available for 78 out of the 80 countries
under consideration. That number for interest rates is 70.
The start of the financial crises themselves is taken from Laeven and
Valencia (2008). The peaks of the recessions are identified using a one-year
window around the start of the financial crisis. In this way, it is ensured that the
recessions under consideration are, in fact, associated with the financial crises.
Note, however, that in some of the crisis periods there was no output loss – in
those cases, following Cecchetti et al. (2010) the duration and the amplitude of the
recession are set equal to zero. Table 2, in the appendix, shows the start of each of
the banking crises under consideration (Laeven and Valencia, 2008).
V.

Empirical Evidence
The effects of monetary and fiscal policies during recessions on the ensuing
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recoveries are first analyzed in the sample of advanced countries, experiencing
“ordinary” recessions. Then, the effects of monetary and fiscal policies are
analyzed in the sample of countries undergoing banking crises.
Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Ordinary Recessions
The table below shows the regression results from estimating the
fixed effects model specified above – regressions (3) and (4). In addition to this
model, one is estimated with a dependant variable the duration of the recession –
regressions (1) and (2). The results of the two sets of models are largely consistent.
The same set of variables is statistically significant in both of them. Also, the
estimations without fixed effects in both cases have a much smaller explanatory
power than the ones with fixed effects.
Table 3 – Results for the severity and sluggishness of ordinary recessions.
(1)
(2)
Duration			
			
Amplitude
-.109
-.133
(-0.91)
(-3.00)***
RealRate
5.39
4.93
(2.60)**
(2.72)***
GC
.134
.006
(1.50)
(0.22)

(3)
-.024
(-.13)
-.488***
(-3.19)
-4.207
(-2.43)***
.120
(.373)

(4)
-.077
(-0.46)
-.130
(-1.47)
-1.005
(-.62)
.008
(.18)

Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Yes
74
0.40

No
66
0.04

Yes
66
0.41

No
66
0.30

Notes: unbalanced panel with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, ***
denote level of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors
used. The dependent variable in (1) and (2) is the duration of the recession. The dependent
variable in (3) and (4) is the recovery growth rate one year after the trough of the recession.

Looking at regression numbered (3) we see that the recession amplitude
has a statistically significant effect on the growth rate in the recovery phase. The
coefficient estimate is statistically significant in difference from zero at the 1
percent level of significance. Note that amplitude measures the percentage decline
in GDP during the recession phase – peak to trough. This result suggests that
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the steeper the recession, the faster the recovery. Furthermore, as expected the
coefficient estimate on the RealRate is also statistically significant in difference
from zero – at the five percent level of significance. As previously noted the
RealRate is the sum of the impulses relative to the policy rule for each quarter over
the recession period. In other words, RealRate represents the sum of the residuals
from an estimated monetary policy rule. This would mean that an increase in the
RealRate corresponds to an increase in money market rates above what a policy
rule warrants. Therefore, as expected the coefficient estimate is negative. However,
government consumption does not significantly affect recovery growth rates. One
reason for this occurrence might be that the estimation does not account for the
level of government debt, something found to be important for the effectiveness
of fiscal policy (IMF, 2009). Furthermore, as Krugman and Eggertsson (2010)
argue, the effect of fiscal policy is the biggest when there are credit constrained
agents in the economy – as during a financial crisis.
The coefficient estimates agree in magnitude with those estimates in
previous studies (IMF, 2009). In addition, the R-squared of the fixed effects
model is pretty high, 40 percent, given that the dependent variable is growth rates
one year after the recession has occurred. However, the R-squared of the model
without the fixed effects is rather low – less than 4 percent of the variation of the
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables included.
The estimation that has the duration of the recession as the dependent
variable (regression equation (1) also suggests that monetary policy significantly
affects the length of the recession.
Monetary Policy in Financial Crises
The table below shows the regression results from estimating the model
for financial crises. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of
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the recession, the recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough
of the recession. The results of these three models are consistent with each other.
In models (1), (2) and (3) increases in government consumption have a significant
negative effect on the duration of the recession and a significant positive effect on
recovery growth rates. The growth rate of GDP prior to the recession also seems
to matter (regression equations (1) and (2)). Countries with higher prior growth
rates tend to have stronger recoveries and shorter recessions.
Table 2 – Results for severity and sluggishness of banking crises.
(1)
Duration		
		
Amplitude		
		
Real GDP (-1)
-.428
(-1.77)*
RealRate
0.011
(0.32)
Cum.Gov.Con.
-.125
(-3.74)***

(2)
-.058
(-.62)
-.066
(0.33)
.232
(1.86)*
.011
(0.50)
.066
(2.06)**

(3)
-.003
(-4.82)***

Observations
R-squared

65
0.14

66
0.40

66
0.17

-.0003
(0.86)
-.0003
(-.79)
.001
(3.23)***

Notes: unbalanced panel with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, ***
denote level of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard
errors used. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of the recession, the
recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the recession.

However, monetary policy does not significantly affect recovery growth
rates, output gaps and duration of the recession. This might be due to the reduced
effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanism during times of
financial distress (IMF, 2009). The same results hold whether real or nominal
rates are used. Furthermore, it does not make a differenceifthe cumulative change
in interest rates over the whole duration of the recession is used or the change in
the first year of the crisis. There have been reversals of policy, especially in the
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crises that involve currency upheavals like the ones in the Asian Financial crisis
so such a check makes sense.
As explained before, the effectiveness of monetary policy might be
affected by the extent to which financial reforms were implemented in the affected
countries. To formally test this hypothesis, a smaller sample of countries is used, for
which data on forbearance is available. Forbearance is the qualitative assessment
of whether banks were permitted to continue functioning despite being technically
insolvent. The regressions below try to assess the impact of forbearance. Again,
three dependent variables are used – the duration of the recession, the recovery
growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the recession.
Table 3 – Results for the effect of monetary policy in the case of forbearance during
banking crises.
(1)
Duration		
		
Amplitude		
Real GDP (-1)
RealRate
RealRate*Forb.
Forb.
Observations
R-squared

-.060
(-0.27)
-.034
(0.59)
.06
(0.92)
-1.35
(2.07)**

(2)
-.052
(-0.40)
-.018
(-0.18)
.006
(0.964)
.004
(0.92)
.092
(1.30)
2.42
(-1.16)

(3)
-.004
(-2.98)***
-.0008
(-0.37)
-.0026***
(-4.34)
.020
(2.70)**
-.020			
(-0.55)

30
.03

30
0.27

30
0.47

Notes: t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** denote level of significance indicating 10%,
5% and 1% respectively. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of
the recession, the recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the
recession. Robust standard errors used.

The coefficient estimates in the model that has recovery growth rates as a
dependent variable are statistically insignificant in difference from zero. However,
in the estimation using the output gap as the dependent variable, the change in
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money market rates is statistically significant. An increase in money market rates
leads to a decrease in the output gap. Furthermore, forbearance dampens the
effect of monetary policy as indicated by the negative coefficient estimate on
RealRate*Forb. Also, this diminishing effect seems to be quite significant as it
is bigger in magnitude than the positive effect of monetary policy on recovery
growth rates. The lack of explanatory power of the independent variables in the
model with recovery growth rates as the regressand agrees with previous studies
which find that recovery growth rates are harder to predict than output gaps (IMF,
2009). Furthermore, we can see that the estimation with duration as the dependent
variable also lacks statistical significance. This might be explained with the
fact that forbearance is defined over the three years following the beginning of
the recession. As a result, its effect might not be felt during the duration of the
recession.
In summary, the empirical results suggest differences between the effects of
monetary and fiscal policies on the duration of recessions and the strength of
recoveries in ordinary recessions and in systemic financial crises. During ordinary
recessions expansionary monetary policy seems to be a powerful tool, generating
significant increases in recovery growth rates. During recessions associated with
financial crises, expansionary monetary policy still has a significant effect on the
strength of the recovery. However, this effect is dependent on the implementation
of prompt financial policies, and in particular, on intervention with insolvent
financial institutions. The effectiveness of fiscal policy is reversed – it is a
powerful tool during banking crises, but it does not seem to significantly affect
recovery growth rates during ordinary recessions.
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VI.

Conclusions
Non-Keynesian policies in the face of a financial crisis are not a thing of

the past. A number of advanced economies have pursued contractionary policies
in the most recent financial crisis. This has certainly been the case in Europe.
Many countries there embraced austerity in the face of a slumping economy –
France, Britain and Ireland, for example. In addition, some EU members had to
settle with insufficiently expansionary monetary policies, because of the outsized
influence of Germany over the European Central bank and the better performance
of the German economy. While policies in the U.S. have been more favorable
towards sustaining a recovery, this has not come without much debate. Ideas and
arguments supporting fiscal retrenchment have abounded. This is exemplified in
the work of some prominent economists like that of Alesina and Ardagna (2009).
The political climate has also been antagonistic towards some of the actions
policy makers have tried to undertake. For example, there was a huge backlash
against the quantitative easing program the Fed started to implement in late 2010
– something that can have a particularly deleterious effect when the economy is
in the midst of a liquidity trap and when the Fed’s credibility in influencing the
public’s expectations is the main tool out (Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2011).
In this paper, I use two different samples with data from 1970 to 2005 to
study the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the profiles of recessions and
recoveries. In other words, I ask whether pursuing non-Keynesian policies has
mattered during past financial crises. Several results emerged from the econometric
analysis. First, monetary policy during ordinary recessions and banking crises is a
powerful tool with lasting effects that extend to recovery growth rates. However,
the effect of monetary policy during financial crises is strongly diminished in the
case of forbearance – banks left to function despite being technically insolvent.
Second, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is reversed – it is a powerful tool during
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banking crises, but it does not seem to significantly affect recovery growth rates
during ordinary recessions. Finally, the policy response during past financial crisis
does not seem to be particularly expansionary – on the contrary, fiscal policy is
markedly procyclical, while monetary policy is neutral. In summary, the results
suggest it is possible that inappropriate fiscal and monetary policies and the lack
of financial reforms could be one reason why recoveries associated with financial
crises turn out to be particularly protracted.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) argue that both advanced and developing
countries suffer from the “this time is different” syndrome when it comes to
financial crises, because policy makers and the public tend to believe that they
are immune from a crisis due to some circumstances that make them special.

2

This paper suggests that this syndrome should be avoided when it comes to policy
as well. This time is not different and expansionary policies should be pursued.
Past financial crises have been so protracted in part because of the embracement
of austerity and in part because of the lack of realization that financial crises are
inherently more severe.

2 An example of that line of thinking involves the securitization process of mortgage backed securities in the U.S. prior to the most recent recession. People thought that these new “synthetic” products have managed to practically eliminate all risk from the economy. With the benefit of hindsight,
we know that this was not the case.
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Figure 1: Output Dynamics in Banking Crises (growth rates)
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Figure 2: Duration of Banking Crises (in years)
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Figure 3: Change in Interest Rates (first year of crisis and peak-to-trough)
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Figure 4: Change in Government Consumption (first year of crisis and peak-to-trough)
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Table 1: Recessions in Advanced Countries (peaks and troughs)
Country

Peak

Trough

Australia

1960 Q3

1961 Q3

Australia

1965 Q2

1966 Q1

Australia

1971 Q3

1972 Q1

Australia

1975 Q2

1976

Australia

1977 Q2

1978

Australia

1981 Q3

1983 Q2

Australia

1990 Q2

1991 Q2

Austria

1978

1979 Q1

Austria

1981

1982 Q1

Austria

1984

1985 Q1

Austria

2001

2002 Q1

Belgium

1982

1983 Q1

Belgium

1992

1993 Q1

Belgium

1998

1998 Q3

Canada

1980 Q1

1980 Q3

Canada

1981 Q2

1983

Canada

1990 Q1

1991 Q1

Denmark

1977 Q3

1978 Q1

Denmark

1980

1981 Q1

Denmark

1988

1988 Q3

Denmark

1993

1993 Q3

Denmark

1995

1995 Q3

Denmark

2002

2003 Q1

Denmark

2005

2006 Q1

France

1974 Q3

1975 Q1

France

1992 Q3

1993 Q2

Germany

1962 Q3

1963 Q1

Germany

1966 Q3

1967 Q2

Germany

1974 Q1

1975 Q2

Germany

1978

1978 Q2

Germany

1980 Q1

1982 Q3

Germany

1992 Q1

1993 Q1

Germany

1995 Q3

1996 Q1

Germany

2002 Q3

2003 Q2

Italy

1981

1981 Q3
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Italy

1982 Q1

1983

Italy

1992 Q1

1993 Q3

Italy

1996 Q1

1997

Italy

2001 Q1

2002

Italy

2003

2003 Q2

Italy

2004 Q3

2005 Q1

Japan

1974

1975 Q1

Japan

1993 Q1

1993 Q3

Japan (financial crisis)

1997 Q1

1999 Q1

Japan

2001 Q1

2002

Netherlands

1980 Q1

1981 Q3

Netherlands

1982 Q1

1983 Q1

Netherlands

2001 Q2

2002 Q1

Portugal

1978

1978 Q2

Portugal

1981 Q2

1982 Q1

Portugal

1983

1984 Q1

Portugal

1992 Q1

1993 Q1

Portugal

2002

2003 Q1

Portugal

2005 Q2

2007 Q1

Spain

1975

1975 Q2

Spain (financial crisis)

1978 Q3

1979 Q1

Spain

1981

1981 Q2

Spain

1992 Q1

1993 Q2

Switzerland

1981 Q2

1983

Switzerland

1986 Q2

1987

Switzerland

1990 Q3

1991 Q2

Switzerland

1992 Q1

1993 Q1

Switzerland

1996 Q1

1996 Q3

Switzerland

2002 Q2

2003 Q2

United Kingdom

1961 Q2

1962

United Kingdom

1973 Q2

1974 Q1

United Kingdom

1974 Q3

1975 Q3

United Kingdom

1979 Q2

1981 Q1

United Kingdom

1990 Q2

1991 Q3

USA

1969 Q3

1971

USA

1974

1975 Q1

USA

1980 Q1

1980 Q3

USA

1981 Q3

1982 Q1

USA

1990 Q2

1991 Q1
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Table 2: Financial Crises included in the sample (Laeven and Valencia, 2008)

Table
Table
2: Table
Financial
2: Financial
2: Financial
Crises
Crises
included
Crises
included
included
in the
insample
the
insample
the(Laeven
sample
(Laeven
and
(Laeven
Valencia,
and Valencia,
and Valencia,
2008)2008)
2008)

Start Start
of Start
of ofDominican
Dominican
Dominican
Republic
Republic
Republic
2003 20032003Norway
Norway
Norway
Country
Country
CountryFinancial
Financial
Financial
Ecuador
Ecuador
Ecuador
1998
1998
1998
Panama
Panama
Panama
CrisisCrisisCrisis
Ecuador
Ecuador
Ecuador
1982 19821982Paraguay
Paraguay
Paraguay
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
2001 20012001
Finland
Finland
Finland
1991 19911991Peru Peru Peru
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
1995 19951995
Ghana
Ghana
Ghana
1982 19821982Philippines
Philippines
Philippines
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
1987 19871987
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau 1995 19951995Philippines
Philippines
Philippines
BeninBeninBenin
1988 19881988
Guyana
Guyana
Guyana
1993 19931993Poland
Poland
Poland
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
1986 19861986
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
1991 19911991Russia
Russia
Russia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
1994 19941994
India IndiaIndia
1993 19931993Senegal
Senegal
Senegal
BrazilBrazilBrazil
1990 19901990
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
1997 19971997Slovak
Slovak
Republic
Slovak
Republic
Republic
BraziBraziBrazi
1994 19941994
Jamaica
Jamaica
Jamaica
1996 19961996SpainSpainSpain
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
1996 19961996
JapanJapanJapan
1997 19971997Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Burkina
Burkina
Faso
Burkina
Faso Faso
1990 19901990
Jordan
Jordan
Jordan
1989 19891989Swaziland
Swaziland
Swaziland
Burundi
Burundi
Burundi
1994 19941994
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
1985 19851985Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Cameroon
Cameroon
Cameroon
1987 19871987
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
1992 19921992Thailand
Thailand
Thailand
Cameroon
Cameroon
Cameroon
1995 19951995
KoreaKoreaKorea
1997 19971997Thailand
Thailand
Thailand
Cape Cape
Verde
Cape
VerdeVerde
1993 19931993
Kuwait
Kuwait
Kuwait
1982 19821982TogoTogoTogo
Central
Central
African
Central
African
Rep.
African
Rep. Rep.
1995 19951995
LatviaLatvia
Latvia
1995 19951995Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
ChadChadChad
1992 19921992
Lithuania
Lithuania
Lithuania
1995 19951995Turkey
Turkey
Turkey
ChileChileChile
1981 19811981
Madagascar
Madagascar
Madagascar
1988 19881988Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
ChileChileChile
1976 19761976
Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
1997 19971997United
United
States
United
StatesStates
China,
China,
P.R.
China,
P.R. P.R.
1998 19981998
Mali Mali Mali
1987 19871987Uruguay
Uruguay
Uruguay
Colombia
Colombia
Colombia
1998 19981998
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
1994 19941994Uruguay
Uruguay
Uruguay
Colombia
Colombia
Colombia
1982 19821982
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
1981 19811981Venezuela
Venezuela
Venezuela
Congo,
Congo,
Republic
Congo,
Republic
of
Republic
of of
1992 19921992
Morocco
Morocco
Morocco
1980 19801980Vietnam
Vietnam
Vietnam
CostaCosta
RicaCosta
Rica Rica
1987 19871987
Mozambique
Mozambique
Mozambique
1987 19871987Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
CostaCosta
RicaCosta
Rica Rica
1994 19941994
NepalNepalNepal
1988 19881988Zambia
Zambia
Zambia
Croatia
Croatia
Croatia
1998 19981998
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
2000 20002000Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe
CzechCzech
Republic
Czech
Republic
Republic 1996 19961996
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
1991 19911991
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1991 19911991
1988 19881988
1995 19951995
1983 19831983
1983 19831983
1997 19971997
1992 19921992
1998 19981998
1988 19881988
1998 19981998
1977 19771977
1989 19891989
1995 19951995
1991 19911991
1997 19971997
1983 19831983
1993 19931993
1991 19911991
2000 20002000
1994 19941994
1988 19881988
1981 19811981
2002 20022002
1994 19941994
1997 19971997
1996 19961996
1995 19951995
1995 19951995

Local Technological and Demographic Effects on Electricity
Transmission: A Spatially Lagged Local Estimation of
New England Marginal Losses
Jacob Hochard

Abstract:
Electricity transmission is subject to distribution losses and congestion
costs. Economists have prior theorized that these transmission imperfections
could create divided markets with electricity generating spatial oligopolists. This
concern has been largely dismissed because of recent technological advances
in electricity transmission. The effects of local technological and demographic
indicators on electricity transmission costs remains both commonly accepted
as negligible and spatially untested. This analysis employs a spatially lagged
local estimation of New England’s marginal electricity losses with respect to
both technological and demographic indicators. The results of this analysis
are consistent with the widely accepted notion that technological advances have
mitigated the effect of local distribution losses and local congestion costs on
electricity prices.

Keywords: Transmission grid losses, locational marginal prices, New England
ISO, technological indicators.

Introduction
Electricity markets and other networked goods like water, oil, cable television
and railways have become an enjoyable research pastime for economists
concerned with market structure issues. Electricity markets are embedded with
unique commodity specific and trade specific considerations that complicate the
analysis of this market. The two most important electricity specific considerations
are (1) the physical laws that electricity must abide by and (2) the limitations of
electricity transmission via infrastructural constraints.
Electricity, in the form of electrons transmitted along a transmission cable, is
subject to a certain degree of “resistance”. This resistance is defined in the form
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of two foundational laws of electricity (1) Ohm’s Law and (2) Kirchoff’s Law.
Ohm’s law connects the three concepts of current, voltage and resistance. Current
can be defined simply as electrons moving through a transmission cable between
two points. Voltage is the force that allows these electrons to move between two
points and resistance is the measurable inhibiting force between those two points
caused by electron transit friction (Kostiner, 1994). Kirchoff’s Law states that
the “sum of all currents entering and exiting a node must be equal to zero”. In
essence, this law states that electrons will travel the path of least resistance. These
two laws have direct applications to electricity trade markets that must be taken
into consideration (Kostiner, 1994).
Under Kirchoff’s law, unlike most traditional commodities, electricity cannot
be stored for future consumption. The transmission grid is therefore always in a
state of perfect production-consumption equilibrium. Ohm’s law also states that
with “resistance” as a function of voltage capacity (the size of the transmission
cable) and current strength there will be inherent distribution losses of electricity.
These distribution losses are also a function of the distance that electrons travel
from the point of production to the point of consumption and the local weather
(Robertazzi, 2007). The existence of “resistance” on the transmission grid also
makes possible transmission grid “congestion” to occur. This congestion occurs
when the current from point A to point B on the transmission grid reaches the
voltage capacity of that respective transmission line. Under Kirchoff’s law,
however, we know that electrons will take the path of least resistance and
congestion into and out of any particular node will be equal.
The physical properties of electricity also have unique benefits. In theory,
a transmission grid without congestion (a high enough voltage and low enough
current) can transfer electricity across long distances, instantly. It has been
argued, for example, that electricity produced from solar resources in Northern
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Africa could be traded competitively in the European electricity markets with
proper transmission voltage capacity expansions (Bauer et. al., 2008). The
demand schedule of electricity is predictable but inconstant. For example, peakdemand typically occurs during a warm day in the early evening when electricity
consumption is high. The transmission grid’s unique range may allow distant
competitive suppliers of electricity to exploit far-reaching peak-demand markets
during their off-peak hours (Shakourig et. al., 2009).
Conventional theory recognizes price increases as a result of distribution
losses and congestion but the impossibility of predicting where produced electricity
will be consumed has overshadowed the potential influence of citing generation
sources in close proximity to electricity demand centers. Furthermore, the spatial
analysis of these grid losses, on a local scale, may have lost its appeal because
advances in transmission capacity are occurring rapidly and better integrating
larger regions. In theory, this would make local indicators less important and
spatial demographic and technological indicators less predictable. The purpose
of this analysis is to estimate locational marginal price losses, resulting from
electricity distribution losses and congestions, using local and demographic
indicators.

Literature Review
Two and a half decades ago Benjamin Hobbs (1985) predicted that
the deregulation of electricity generation would create spatial oligopolists
resulting from network barriers. Hobbs conducted a theoretic Nash-Bertrand
spatial equilibrium to predict the price variation of electricity in New York’s
regional markets. His results showed that transport costs and significant scale
economies would yield generator spatial oligopolists. The spatial oligopolists
would cause regional price increases and the ability for generators – with natural
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barriers caused by transport costs - to exercise market power. Over the past
25 years, however, the scale of these economies has increased drastically. The
grid is interconnected extremely well and technological advances have allowed
for less costly electricity transmission across further distances. These changes
may have removed the natural barriers that Hobbs envisioned in the mid-1980s.
Additionally, Hobbs’ analysis is conducted using a theoretic price equilibrium
calculated using mathematically linear programs to obtain local spatial price
equilibria. This theoretic concept deserves attention using spatial analysis.
The Independent Electricity Market Operator (IEMO) in charge of
operating the electricity grid in Ontario released a PowerPoint in January, 2004
outlining historical nodal pricing analysis on their grid. This operator references
spatial analysis and its relevance to the impact of congestion and relative losses on
the electricity market. The presentation uses locational marginal prices (LMPs)
that include a congestion and loss component1. This analysis found that losses,
not congestion, contributed the most to pricing variation on the local grid. These
system operators have perfect information and were able to determine which
transfers incurred the highest losses. In this case, the highest rate of congestion
occurred along the East-West Transfer interfaces, whereas the highest losses
from distribution occurred between the Northwest and Northeast regions of the
grid. No spatial analysis was considered to determine if generators’ proximity to
demand centers influenced grid losses.
Ostergaard (2004) examines critically the geographic distribution of
electricity generation in relation to grid losses in Denmark. The Danish example
is particularly interesting because over 40% of consumed electricity is covered by
scattered sources as a result of large scale wind turbine investments. Ostergaard
1

In theory, an electricity system (in this case IEMO) will have one theoretic price across the entire
system – any pricing deviations occur as a result of incurred congestion and distance of travel
losses.
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adopts basic assumptions to map the distribution of generated electricity in
order to conduct a consumption-production spatial analysis. In order to model
transmission grid flows, Ostergaard uses EnergyPro GRID a complex model
founded on an algorithm designed to predict transmission flows throughout a grid.
His analysis concludes that it is essential for Denmark to control generation not
only at an aggregate level but also at a local level to prevent congestion from
occurring. A suggestion is given to coordinate local and regional electricity
production to ensure a fair balance without the inefficient alternative of electricity
traveling far distances, incurring distribution costs.
Baban and Perry (2000) used spatial analysis to determine the optimized
locations of new wind farm investments in England. These clean electricity
generators were determined based upon geographic constraints (including
topography, land use, wind direction, wind speed, population, road access,
hydrology and historical and cultural land marks). The only factor that was
considered with regard to transmission compatibility was a constraint that the
wind farm is within 10 KM of the transmission grid. On the demand side, the
only consideration with regard to population was actually a 2 KM buffer on large
settlements. This type of consideration speaks volumes of traditional electricity
generator citing ideologies. The cost in distribution losses, transmission losses
and congestion losses are not considered carefully when citing an electricity
generator in distant proximity from its intended consumers of electricity.

Methodology
I retrieved the source data for LMP nodes across New England for the
year of 2008. This data was created by the Independent System Operator of New
England (ISO-NE). I used Google Earth to locate the coordinates of each of
these nodes and converted this coordinate data to a point data shapefile. This
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pricing data is in terms of $/Kilowatt Hour (KWH) and is valid for June 11th,
2008 for electricity trade from 6:00PM – 7:00PM2. I retrieved source data for
electricity generators, with their respective generating capacities, present in New
England valid for the year of 2008. I used the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) facility registration database to locate each of these generator’s respective
addresses. I then used Google Earth to locate the coordinates of these addresses
and created a point data shapefile with these coordinates (Figure 1). United States
(U.S.) spatial demographic data valid for the year of 2000 was retrieved from
the U.S. census, to create demographic indicators (population and population
density). Finally, transmission grid spatial data, including individual line voltage
capacities, was obtained from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) valid for 1993.
I created 587 Thiessen polygons around my 813 LMP nodes (Figure 2).
In some cases, there was more than one node located at an identical location.
These prices were averaged because under Ohm’s and Kirchoff’s laws and the
framework of the transmission network, electricity prices at identical locations
are by identity, equal. I estimated the population and population density of each
Thiessen polygon by converting my census block-level population data to a
raster file and then using zonal statistics to sum population. I then calculated the
geometry of these polygons and conducted a simple field summation to determine
estimated population density. I also use field calculations to estimate electricity
generation capacity, transmission capacity/per capita, and total transmission
length within each polygon.
I employed a spatially-lagged ordinary least squares (OLS) model to
estimate the effect of these spatial and technological indicators on the nodal marginal
2 This date and time was chosen because it was one of the warmest days recorded during the summer of 2008. This year was also the most recent year that LMP data was available.
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electricity losses. In addition to the focal indicators, I included a dummy variable
that was present (1) if my dependant variable spatial accuracy was to the street level
and not-present (0) if the dependant variable was only accurate to the town level.
Yi = b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6YNi + ui
Y = Marginal Loss Component ($/KWH)
X1 = Length of grid (Miles)
X2 = Generator Capacity (Kilowatts)
X3 = Voltage Capacity / Per Capita (Kilovolts)
X4 = Population Density (PP/KM2)
X5 = Precision Dummy Variable (1,0)
YN i = Spatially Lagged Neighborhood Weights of Marginal Loss
Component
Lastly, a breusch-pagan test was employed to test our estimates for the presence
of heteroskedasticic errors.
Results
None of the focal explanatory variables had an estimated coefficient
that was statistically significant in difference from zero (Table 2). The coefficient
estimate on the dummy variable for dependant variable precision (at the street level)
was negative and statistically significant. This dummy variable suggests that my
flawed data reporting accuracy does affect my overall estimates. This dummy
variable coefficient is relatively intuitive as it would appear that estimated effects
on a marginal loss price component would be less in an area that the node may not
actually exist. These nodal centers are likely to have higher population densities
and transmission grid presence. Flawed accuracy may discount this estimation.
The spatially lagged estimated coefficient is positive and statistically
significant. This is expected as most of our chosen variables are inherently
spatially-autocorrelated (Table 1). The worst spatial autocorrelation exists within
our dependant variable with a positive Moran’s I coefficient of 0.79 (Table 1).
The coefficient estimates do not appear to have heteroskedastic error terms but
despite the spatially lagged variable the coefficient estimates still suffer from
spatial autocorrelation.
47

Conclusions
These results do not support my null hypothesis that local technological
and demographic indicators affect electricity’s marginal loss component at LMP
nodes. These results support multiple conclusions. In a perfectly operating
transmission network there would be no variation across our spatially lagged
variable.

That is, the distribution losses would be constant and minimal

across spatial units. The estimated model only explains about three-quarters
of the variation in our loss component. We can conclude, therefore that there
are technological and demographic negative influences on the New England
transmission network causing distribution losses.
Since we have variation in our distribution loss prices but that variation
cannot be explained with local indicators, we can conclude that the distribution
losses are being incurred at locations beyond the reaching of our spatial “Thiessen
polygon” units. This may support that electricity is being produced in distant
locations from where it is being consumed. This conclusion is a success story
for the New England transmission grid. A distant spatial relationship between
supply and demand of electricity supports that there is little congestion mitigating
distant trade. This conclusion is also supported by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) stating recently that New England is a transmission system
with close to no transmission congestion.
This study does suffer from many limitations. This study does not account
for a potential “edge effect”. I was not able to obtain import and export data for
New England or spatial data for the neighboring New York Independent System
Operator (NYISO). New York City is a major demand center in close proximity
to Connecticut. This may be one reason why the left-hand side observations in
this area have such a high Moran’s I coefficient (Figure 3). Also, limited resources
and funding have forced me to use imperfect data. My transmission grid data was
created by FEMA for national security impact assessment not transmission grid
analysis. This particular dataset is also two decades invalid. Finally, despite using
a spatially-lagged model, my regression estimates still suffer from the presence of
autcorrelated errors. I chose not to pursue this problem any further because the
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spatially autocorrelated errors preserve unbiased but inefficiency estimates. The
relatively low z-scores of my estimates indicate that even with corrected errors the
coefficients would likely remain statistically insignificant.

Appendix
Figure 1 – Electricity structure in Suffolk County, Boston, MA including 2008
electricity generators, 2008 locational marginal prices, 1993 transmission grid,
and the local county boundaries.
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Figure 2 – New England electricity marginal losses ($/KWH) for June 11th, 20008
from 6:00PM-7:00PM. This map includes generators and locational marginal
price (LMP) nodes.
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Figure 3 – Thiessen polygon-level Moran’s I values for New England Electricity
Marginal Losses on June 11th, 2008 from 6:00 PM-7:00 PM.
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Table 1 – Estimations from spatially-lagged ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as well as summary statistics and tests for heteroskedastic and spatially
autocorrelated error terms.
Hochard	
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Table 1 – Estimations from spatially-lagged ordinary least squares (OLS) regression as well as
summary statistics and tests for heteroskedastic and spatially autocorrelated error terms.

Table
2 – Univariate Moran’s I coefficients for each variable.
Table 2 – Univariate Moran’s I coefficients for each variable.
Variable

Moran’s I Coefficient

Locational Marginal Prices ($/KWH)

0.7940

Length of transmission grid (Miles)

0.3188

Generation capacity (KWH)

-0.0029

Capacity/Per Capita (KV/PP)

0.3729

Population Density (PP/KM2)

0.5140
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“Does It Pay to Be Informed?”
Expenditure Efficiency in the US Mutual Fund Industry
Jan Cerny
Introduction
The mutual fund industry would like us to believe that fund expenses
are justifiable by their extensive management expertise, security analysis and the
consequent delivery of returns that exceed the market performance. Management
know-how is costly and thus it drives up the expenditure of actively managed
mutual funds and potentially lowers their net returns. Nevertheless the fund
managers argue that their contributions to the returns fully outweigh their costs
and in general their trading strategies add value to the investors. On the other
hand many academics hold that such claims are fundamentally misleading and
actively managed funds cannot continuously outperform a market index (See:
Carhart 1997, Jensen 1968, Malkiel 2003, Sharpe 1964).
This study aims to provide additional insight into the debate by examining
the performance of US equity mutual funds over the period of 2002 – 2010. I
carry out empirical analysis to evaluate relative performance of the funds and
test whether managers can justify their expenses and fees by higher risk adjusted
returns. This provides valuable implications about the validity of the Efficient
Market Hypothesis (EMH) as developed by Sharpe (1964) and is beneficial to the
broad public that engages in various fund-picking strategies.
The preponderance of studies regarding mutual fund performance
indicates that the topic is of crucial importance to the academics, practitioners and
general public. Unlike most of the previous works, I do not focus on individual
characteristics of funds that could be used for prediction of future returns. Instead,
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I examine the performance of the mutual fund market as a whole and test the
efficiency of resource expenditure across the industry over a period that is yet to
be fully covered by the researchers. I explore the concept of costly information in
financial markets and hypothesize that the market is in informational equilibrium
where resources are spent efficiently.
For fund expenditure to be “efficient”, it must satisfy the equilibrium
condition that the marginal cost equals marginal benefit. Return maximization is
the proclaimed primary goal of mutual funds and so the funds should generate new
expenses only if such expenses are offset by resulting higher returns. Thus, in theory,
any extra research and trading may take place only if they add value to the fund. If
such activities that are inevitably costly do not add enough value to outweigh their
cost, the industry does not spend their resources efficiently. Such finding would
suggest investors should focus on funds that minimize their expenditure to the point
where the marginal cost of their activities equal their marginal benefit.
In addition to examining the EMH, analyzing performance of the
funds and efficiency of their expenditure, this study provides insight into the
controversial assumption of perfect investor rationality. Theoretically, assuming
perfect information and rational consumers, investors would not pay high fees
to mutual fund managers unless the managers could deliver (or create credible
expectation of) returns that would exceed the management costs. In other words,
if active trading did not add value, rational consumers would adjust in a long run
and seek alternative investment strategies which would diminish the demand for
actively trading funds.
In the first section of this paper, I review past literature and examine its
contributions and shortcomings. In the second section I discuss the theoretical
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background of informational equilibrium and resource expenditure efficiency.
Next I introduce the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and develop its
extended version that I employ in my panel data analysis. Subsequently I discuss
my data in the third section and present the empirical evidence in the fourth
section. Lastly, I point out the limitations of my work and draw conclusions
regarding my hypotheses.

Literature Review
The ability of mutual fund managers to earn excess risk-adjusted returns1
has been of great interest to researchers for years. Prior to the 1990s the general
consensus of academics was that investors are not able to earn such returns and
no fund characteristics could substantially aid them in predicting which managers
will become the next winners or losers. Nonetheless, numerous studies after
1990 arrived at opposite conclusions, claiming that returns on mutual funds
and underlying securities are predictable to a certain degree. These researchers
concluded that some types of analysis and trading activity allow for superb returns,
which supports the case of “skilled managers” (Malkiel 1995). The literature on
the performance of asset management strategies and mutual funds that is relevant
to this study can be divided into three general categories:

1.) Testing the efficient market hypothesis (EMH).
Eugene Fama gave birth to the EMH in the 1960s claiming that, under the
semi-strong version of the hypothesis, security prices instantly reflect all
available public information. Consequently there is no information that the
traders could employ to outsmart or time the market. Thus any charting or
fundamental analysis will fail to generate substantial risk-adjusted excess
1 Returns in excess of the risk free rate on Treasury Bills are generally referred to as “excess
returns”
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returns. The weak form of the EMH holds that there are no patterns in stock
prices and so the active management is likely going to significantly increase
expenses while only marginally contributing to returns. Therefore, no one
is able to systematically benefit from the inefficiencies of the market and no
research or expertise can enhance the fund returns over several years.
		

Ever since its creation, EMH has been tested by hundreds of empirical

studies that aimed to determine the extent to which markets are efficient.
The early tests focused on charting and technical analysis, that are often
associated with active trading, and found most such techniques utterly
worthless in predicting future price movements (Karz 2010). However, the
professionals practicing these arguably futile methods have not been driven
out of the market and so, under the assumption of consumer rationality, their
service must be considered valuable. In reality most financial institutions
continue to spend billions to support their technical analysis departments.
		

Academics have also identified several anomalies and patterns that would

allow active traders to capture substantial risk-adjusted excess returns, such as the
“size effect” or the “January effect”. Nevertheless, many studies concluded that
once such patterns are documented and made public, the investors exploit these
new opportunities to the extent that the patterns disappear or become unprofitable.
The academic research also points out the paradox of EMH. This paradox states
that, if all investors believed that markets were efficient, no one would spend
resources on thorough asset analysis, and so the market would effectively become
inefficient. Thus, the fund managers who do not believe in market efficiency
and carry out asset research in pursuit of outperforming the benchmarks play a
crucial role in actually making the market efficient. Overall, academic research
and back-testing provided a relatively strong support for the validity of EMH
across different periods and diverse markets. Therefore, high expenses generated
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by active management research are not likely to be sufficiently offset by their
higher returns.
2.) Existence of manager stock picking or market timing skills.
Many researchers designed empirical studies to test the existence of skill or
talent of portfolio managers that would enable the funds to pick the winning
stock or to properly time their market entry and exit points. Generally, the
scholarly literature refutes the concept of superior stock picking skills as
a determinant of fund returns (See the renowned study by Carhart 1997
or Henriksson 1984). Nonetheless, a limited number of studies argue that
some managers do possess exceptional skills that allow them to exceed the
market returns with some level of persistence (See: Gray and Kern 2010).
Hendricks and Zeckhauser (1991), for example, examined the period of
1975-88 and found that extensive research and active management strategy
of mutual funds could yield an excess return of 3% to 4% every year net of
expenses. If such skills did exist my analysis should indicate that at least
some funds were able to significantly outperform the market after expenses.
3.) Persistence in mutual fund performance.
A large body of literature focuses on the persistence in mutual fund
performance claiming that, if there were outstanding actively trading mutual
fund managers, it would be likely that their excess returns would display
some level of continuity. Said differently, good players would be expected
to win more often than others. Nonetheless, past research does not support
the existence of long term persistence in mutual fund returns and the higher
the expenses the shorter the persistence in positive returns usually is. For
example Carhart (1997) documented that, even though some evidence for
short term persistence of returns can be found, future performance of mutual
funds is almost impossible to predict.
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In addition to this wealth of academic literature, thousands of investment
practitioner articles discuss approaches that should allow investors to select the
best mutual funds based on their history or characteristics. This literature often
holds turnover and expense ratios to be substantial determinants of fund returns.
Some suggest that low turnover (buy-and-hold strategy) and low expenses are
desirable while others believe that high turnover (active trading) may be an
indicator of sound strategy and that higher transaction costs of frequent trading
are fully offset by increased returns. This segment of the literature fails to reach
a consensus regarding the role of expenses in determination of returns and often
suffers from severe methodological problems such as omission of survivorship
bias, which leads to false sense of return predictability (Peterson et al. 2002)
Methodology
This study builds on the theories developed by Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) and Ippolito (1989) who introduce the concept of costly information into
the debate over the validity of EMH. Grossman and Stiglitz assert that EMH cannot hold since prices cannot reflect all available information, because if they did,
traders who spent resources on obtaining such information would not receive any
compensation (1980). I apply this framework on the equity mutual fund market
and focus on the role of expenditure that is associated with the acquisition of information. Most of the “active trading” strategies rely on the premise of special
skill or information of the managers. These strategies are bound to be very costly
as they are characterized by notably high turnover, which increases transaction
costs, and higher management fees, resulting from employment of larger amounts
of human capital (Sharpe 1991, Carhart 1997). It follows, that for these strategies
to be successful, their benefit needs to outweigh their cost. Conversely, passive
management strategies such as indexing could be classified as a buy-and-hold
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strategy with a predictably low portfolio turnover and low expenses. Thus observing a negative relationship between expenses (indicating information acquisition)
and the excess returns would suggest that active management at its high levels
does not add value to investors and passive investment strategies should be pursued.
Recognizing the existence of these dissimilar management styles, I make
the simplification that the market can be divided into two types of traders: the
“informed” and the “uninformed” ones. The “informed” managers believe in
existence of some information or skill that can increase their performance even
net of expenses. On the other hand, the “uninformed” managers believe that there
is no such information that would be worth looking for. Said differently, these
traders hold that active management with its extensive research creates more
expenses than it can offset by potentially higher returns. Thus the “uninformed”
traders generally follow a market index and focus on minimizing their expenses.
In this work I utilize the information equilibrium theory to address the
claims of both types of traders. It is clear that acquisition of information and skills
requires expenditure of time and other resources. Thus one would not engage
in activity such as market research without expectations of appropriate rewards.
Rational agents are on average able to learn from their experience. Therefore if
the agents did not receive any rewards for their expenditure, they would no longer
pursue the path that proved fruitless. Given these assumptions, in equilibrium, the
marginal return to additional research or information will equal its marginal cost.
In such equilibrium, all incentives to get more or less informed diminish.
Applying this framework to the EMH, it seems plausible that managers
are able to outperform the market before expenses. Nevertheless, the risk60

adjusted excess returns disappear after the as the expenses are subtracted from
the higher returns. If the managers that focus on costly research and trading
were able to outperform the market net of expenses on continuous basis the
relationship between their expenses and returns would be positive. Conversely,
if the traditional form of EMH holds, trading on special skill or information is
essentially a losing game as such practice can only increase expenses without
enhancing the returns, which reflects a negative relationship between expenses
and fund performance. Lastly, if the market is in informational equilibrium, there
will be no relationship between expenses and returns net of fees as any excess
returns created by extensive research will be exactly offset by higher cost.
In this work I test this relationship over a broad sample of 500 mutual
funds. First, I employ the renowned Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as
developed by Sharpe (1964) to analyze the actual performance of the funds. I
estimate the following time series regression model for each fund in the dataset:
(1) Rjt – Rft = α + β (Rmt – Rft) + µ
Where Rjt is a return on a mutual fund net of fees in period t, Rft is a
risk free interest rate at year t and Rmt is a return on a broad market portfolio
such as the S&P 500. This model is widely accepted in the financial industry and
allows me evaluate the relative risk-adjusted performance of the mutual funds.
According to Sharpe (1964), the return on a security or a fund less the risk free
rate is directly proportionate to the amount of risk that the fund takes on. This
relies on the observation that investors need to be rewarded for taking on extra
risk. Such reward is known as the CAPM risk premium. Thus risk, measured
by the coefficient β, is the major determinant of returns. In general, β represents
the sensitivity of expected excess returns on a fund or an asset j to the expected
market returns, which is expressed by the following relationship:
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The unexplained portion of the regression, reflected in the intercept α,
is then attributed to management skill and expertise. Positive alphas indicate that
a fund was able to outperform the market on risk adjusted basis. Nevertheless,
the EMH clearly suggests that the expected value of alpha is zero because, on
average, funds cannot outperform the market as there is no information or practice
that would enable them to continuously do so.
If active management and research do not add value, funds engaging in
such practices will systematically underperform the index funds and will likely
display significantly negative alphas as a result of high expenditures. However,
in informational equilibrium, both actively managed and index funds will perform
comparably, resulting in alphas that are mostly indistinguishable from zero.
Furthermore, the average coefficient of β across the funds should be equal to unity
as a random broad sample of widely diversified funds should in essence mimic the
market, possessing on average as much risk as the market itself.
Thus I hypothesize the following:
H1: E(α) = 0
H2: E(β) = 1
In the second part of the paper I use the respective alpha and beta
estimates from (1) to examine the role of expenses and turnover in determination
of fund returns. Inspired by Jensen and Ippolito, I expand the CAPM model by
including the turnover and expense ratios of funds as well as the variable BMktRF
(=βj*(Rmt – Rft) ), which is a multiple of estimated beta of a fund and the market
return in excess of the risk free rate2. I construct a pooled dataset of the sample and
estimate the following OLS panel regression model:
(2) Rjt – Rft = b βj*(Rmt – Rft) + τ turnoverjt + e expensejt + yYear + f Fund + µ
2 For detailed discussion, see the data section.
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Where Year and Fund are dummy variables unique to each fund and
time period. These variables address the problem of correlation of the residuals.
The coefficient βj estimated in regression (1), becomes a part of an explanatory
variable3. The way βj is estimated in (1) results in the fact that the coefficient b on
the variable βj*(Rmt – Rft) should be statistically insignificant in difference from
unity and so this coefficient is not key for the inference about my hypotheses.
On the other hand the variables turnover and expenses play an essential
role as they can explain some of the fund performance that was previously captured
by alphas. I hypothesize that funds generally spend their resources efficiently.
Therefore the coefficient on expenses should be statistically insignificant in
difference from zero, supporting the irrelevance of expenses hypothesis. A
positive coefficient would suggest that managers are not only able to offset the
higher expenses created by research and trading, but that the extra returns of such
strategy outweigh the extra costs.
Thus, unlike most studies that simply assume a negative relationship
between expenses and returns net of expenses, I test the relationship and
hypothesize a neutral impact of expenses on returns:
H3: e = 0
Lastly, to understand the connection between equations (1) and (2),
one should take into account that the first model simply states that returns
are determined by the movement of the market and an unexplained cluster of
management skill and information. The second regression is then used to analyze
this cluster and examine whether some of this unexplained portion of returns is
attributable to expenses or fund turnover.
3

Usage of an estimated coefficient as a part of an explanatory variable inevitably injects extra
variation in the regression.
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Data
In my research if would be optimal to work with monthly Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data that are used in most of the academic
studies. However, my data selection is restricted by the research budget as the
financial data of the mutual fund industry are generally very costly. I limited the
range of my data to eight annual observations in years 2002-2010 for a universe of
small-cap growth, large-cap growth, small-cap value and large-cap value equity
mutual funds, as supplied by Lipper – the Thompson Reuters Company. Ideally
all observation would be included for all time periods to make my panel data
balanced. Nevertheless, as I point out in the limitations section, this is not the case
and my dataset misses about 7% of its observations.
To construct a sample from this universe of 2191 funds I randomly select
500 mutual funds and categorize them according to their asset classes. The basic
version of my dataset includes: fund returns net of expenses, turnover and expense
ratios. Furthermore I add the excess return on the market (Rmt– Rft) denoted as
MktRf. This variable was obtained from online “French and Fama Library” and is
constructed as follows (Kenneth R. French - Data Library):
The excess return on the market is computed by subtracting the Treasury
bill rate (obtained from Ibbotson Associates) from the value-weighted return on
all stocks traded in the United States (obtained from CRSP). This variable is likely
to move closely with the excess returns of any particular mutual fund and so I
expect it to hold a significant explanatory power.
Furthermore, to answer my research question I construct the dependent
variable for excess returns of the funds (exreturn) by subtracting the risk free
interest rate on ten-year Treasury bills from the percentage return on the fund net
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market during the period. The distribution of the sample funds across categories is
depicted in Table 1, and Table 2 summarizes my data. For detailed data summary
see Appendix 1.

Table	
  1	
  
Category	
  Frequency	
  in	
  Percentages	
  
Growth	
  
41%	
  
25%	
  

Large	
  	
   Cap	
  
Small	
  Cap	
  

	
  

Value	
  
21%	
  
12%	
  

Table	
  2	
  
Summary	
  of	
  Data	
  

Variable	
  

#	
  Observations	
  

Mean	
  

St.	
  dev	
  

Minimum	
  

Maximum	
  

Exreturn	
  

3701	
  

3.44	
  

25.9	
  

-‐60.40	
  

164.26	
  

MktRf	
  

4000	
  

3.93	
  

23.18	
  

-‐39.94	
  

32.12	
  

Turnover	
  

3658	
  

90.82	
  

97.99	
  

1	
  

1359	
  

Expense	
  

3613	
  

1.46	
  

.64	
  

.07	
  

12.42	
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Table 2 correctly points out that my panel is not balanced as the variables
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  342	
  and	
  387	
  observations	
  respectively.	
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  some	
  

exreturn, turnover and expense are missing 299, 342 and 387 observations
observations	
  are	
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  the	
  dataset	
  does	
  not	
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  from	
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  bias4	
  as	
  the	
  

respectively. Although some observations are absent, the dataset does not suffer
vast	
  majority	
  of	
  the	
  sample	
  funds	
  survived	
  throughout	
  the	
  examined	
  period.	
  In	
  fact	
  the	
  mean	
  

from substantial survivorship bias as the vast majority of the sample funds survived
4

number	
  of	
  periods	
  observed	
  per	
  fund	
  is	
  7.402	
  with	
  minimum	
  of	
  3	
  and	
  maximum	
  of	
  8	
  periods	
  

throughout the examined period. In fact the mean number of periods observed per
available	
  per	
  funds.	
  Most	
  of	
  the	
  unobserved	
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  seem	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  simple	
  fact	
  that	
  

fund is 7.402 with minimum of 3 and maximum of 8 periods available per funds.
the	
  fund	
  were	
  not	
  yet	
  in	
  existence	
  in	
  the	
  earlier	
  years	
  of	
  the	
  examined	
  period.	
  I	
  further	
  examine	
  

Most of the unobserved periods seem to be a result of the simple fact that the fund
this	
  potential	
  problem	
  of	
  “creation	
  bias”	
  in	
  the	
  limitations	
  section	
  of	
  this	
  work.	
  

were not yet in existence in the earlier years of the examined period. I further
4 Survivorship Bias refers to a tendency to omit failed mutual funds from performance evaluation.
If only funds that were successful enough to survive were included in the sample, the performance results could be skewed upwards as the sample would not reflect the inferior returns of
funds that have gone out of business.
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1

examine this potential problem of “creation bias” in the limitations section of this
work.
several
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Figure 1

90.8%, suggesting that an average fund in the sample turned over about 91% of
its holdings during a year. Turnover rate is calculated by dividing the fund’s total
sales or purchases (whichever is less) by its average monthly assets. The rate then
represents the percentage of the fund holdings that change over the course of the
year. Taking this knowledge into account I notice an outlier in the turnover data:
1359. It seems unlikely that a fund would turn all its assets over more than 13
times in a year. In fact, Figure 1 illustrates that only a negligible percentage of the
turnover observations are greater than 600. Since the large outlier might impact
coefficient estimation I drop the outliers beyond five standard deviations from the
mean (turnover of 580). This seems theoretically justifiable as it is improbable
that even very active funds would turn their assets over more than six times a year
(Wermers 2002). By omitting the potential outliers I drop 23 observations5, but
the estimates of the model change only very marginally.
To account for the unique characteristics of each fund and each year I
construct dummy variables that also enable me to address the problem of
correlation between residuals. It is reasonable to assume that the funds are unique
as different fund managers arguably possess different skills and employ dissimilar
5

Only 0.63% of turnover data is omitted under this restriction.
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investment strategies. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that fund managers did
not change during the examined period or that if a manager left, the fund carried
on the investment strategy, style and know-how of the original manager. This also
implies that the targeted level of risk of the fund, reflected by the fund’s Beta, has
not changed during the period, which is an essential assumption of the CAPM
analysis. Using the methodology of Ippolito I test this assumption against my data
by running a regression for each fund with a dummy variable D and its interaction
term with the MktRf variable. The regression equation takes on the following
form:
(3)

Rjt – Rft = α + β (Rmt – Rft) + c D + d (Rmt – Rft)*D + µ

where D is a dummy variable for years 2006-2009. If the coefficient d were
statistically significant in difference from zero, the assumption of constant beta
would be highly questionable. I find that 82 funds or about 16% of my sample
display betas that are not stable at the 95% confidence interval. Exclusion of these
funds from my analysis however does not change the results substantially.
Limitations
This study faces several key limitations that need to be addressed. First,
due to the nature of my data, I am unable to separate trading costs and management
expenses that are both reflected in the total expenses. Such division would enable
me to make a stronger argument about the impact of management fees on the riskadjusted returns. Nonetheless, the correlation6 between expenses and turnover,
which is directly related to trading costs, is relatively low. Therefore most of the
expenses seem attributable to management fees. Consequently my results are
mostly indicative of the role of management expenditure in determination of
returns.
6 The correlation coefficient is 0.17
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Second, my research faces the “black box” problem for I am unable
to ascertain changes in portfolio holdings or drifts in the beta of the funds. In
particular, I assume that targeted level of risk (beta) and core investment strategy of
the fund remained constant during the period. These assumptions are theoretically
sound as most funds position themselves as pursuing a certain investment style
and strive to retain this image in the eyes of investors. However, if this were not
the case, my estimates of the panel data regression would not accurately reflect the
true relationships between the dependent and explanatory variables.
Third, my panel dataset is not balanced and suffers from a survivorship
bias. In fact, because of the constrained data selection process I can examine only
those funds that were still operating in 2011. Thus no funds in my dataset cease
their existence during the analyzed period and 114 funds were not yet in business
at the beginning of 2002. As Figure 2 indicates the number of funds in the market
declined by approximately 6% over the period 2002-2009, while the number of
operating funds in my sample actually increased by 28%. This “creation bias”
may skew my results. Nevertheless, it seems to have a relatively minor impact
on my estimates and so it does not substantially threaten the credibility of my
conclusions. In addition, it is interesting to note that the net asset value (NAV) of
the mutual fund industry had been increasing at an unprecedented rate until the
financial crisis in 2008.
Fourth, this study can be subject to the criticism that the very limited
number of time series observations used for estimation of alphas and betas may
cause such estimates to be seriously inaccurate. Although a greater number of
observations in the regression analysis would certainly be very beneficial, the
utilized dataset should provide a good general sense of the size of the true
coefficients. Future research should employ quarterly observations for the given
period to produce more accurate estimates of the alphas and betas.
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Lastly, my analysis faces several econometric problems. Researchers
have abundantly documented that using pooled data of this kind is likely to result
in positive correlation among residuals. The often complex correlation between
the residuals across time and across the industry would have a diminishing impact
on the size of the standard errors of the estimates and could occur trough two
avenues: The error terms may be correlated for a group of funds during a given
year (due to the value and small stock effects etc.) or may be serially correlated for
a specific fund (high performers may have generally positive residuals) (Ippolito
1989). I address this issue by including dummy variables for years and funds as
well as using HAC standard errors.

Results
First, let us focus on the relative performance of funds across the time
period to understand the patterns in their returns. Table 3 provides an overview
of the coefficients alpha and beta estimated for each fund using the CAPM model
(1). As I expected, the mean beta is close to the beta of market which is a unity.
This finding supports my hypothesis H2 that on average the widely diversified
funds hold as much risk as the market itself does (H2: E(β) = 1).
Furthermore, the average alpha of the sample is negative, suggesting
that the funds on average slightly underperformed the market on risk adjusted
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Table3	
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  for	
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  Sample	
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  Dev.	
  
2.56	
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ranging	
  from	
  very	
  dissimilar	
  market	
  and	
  economic	
  conditions	
  involving	
  financial	
  uncertainty	
  to	
  

indistinguishable from zero are smaller. This fact may be attributable to numerous
factors ranging from very dissimilar market and economic conditions involving
financial uncertainty to shortcomings of my data.
Additionally, I estimate the mean alphas and turnover ratios by
different fund categories to examine potential patterns in the industry. The results
of this estimation are reported in table 5.
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-‐1.25	
  
-‐1.01	
  
Large	
  Cap	
  
94.04	
  
58.26	
  
	
  
Small	
  Cap	
  
-‐0.15	
  
1.27	
  
Small	
  Cap	
  
122.23	
   71.92	
  
	
  
The	
  table	
  provides	
  several	
  appealing	
  observations.	
  	
  The	
  largest	
  negative	
  alphas	
  on	
  

The table provides several appealing observations.

The largest

average	
  alphas
were	
  documented	
  
the	
  large	
  
cap	
  growth	
  in
category	
  
while	
  
small	
  
cap	
  value	
  
category	
  
negative
on averagein	
  were
documented
the large
cap
growth
category
displayed	
  
n	
  average	
  
he	
  greatest	
  
positive	
  aon
lphas.	
  
	
  Since	
  m
ost	
  
of	
  the	
  security	
  
research	
  
and	
  
while
small ocap
value tcategory
displayed
average
the
greatest
positive
alphas.
information	
  
readily	
  
available	
  
in	
  the	
  large	
  
ap	
  growth	
  category,	
  
it	
  is	
  reasonable	
  
Since
most ofis	
  the
security
research
and cinformation
is readily
available to	
  
inassume	
  
the that	
  

large
growth
category,
it is areasonable
to assume
that ithe
marginal
on be	
  
the	
  cap
marginal	
  
return	
  
on	
  research	
  
nd	
  information	
  
is	
  the	
  lowest	
  
n	
  the	
  
category.	
  return
This	
  would	
  
research
andtrue	
  
information
is the
lowestwin
category.
would
be wespecially
especially	
  
if	
  mutual	
  fund	
  
managers	
  
ho	
  the
actually	
  
carry	
  oThis
ut	
  the	
  
research	
  
ould	
  be	
  slower	
  to	
  
trueact	
  
ifomutual
fund
managers
who
actually
carry
out theinformation	
  
research would
be slower
n	
  certain	
  
information	
  
than	
  
public	
  
traders.	
  
Conversely,	
  
is	
  generally	
  
scarce	
  
to among	
  
act onsmall	
  
certain
information than public traders. Conversely, information is
cap	
  stocks	
  and	
  particularly	
  in	
  the	
  small	
  cap	
  value	
  category.	
  Therefore	
  marginal	
  
generally scarce among small cap stocks and particularly in the small cap value

return	
  to	
  research	
  could	
  be	
  the	
  highest	
  in	
  this	
  stock	
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  mutual	
  fund	
  managers	
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category. Therefore marginal return to research could be the highest in this stock
truly	
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  analysis	
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class, enabling mutual fund managers to truly benefit from their security analysis
	
  

Such	
  hypotheses	
  are	
  generally	
  supported	
  by	
  my	
  findings.	
  The	
  large	
  mean	
  alpha	
  in	
  

and trading expertise.

small	
  cap	
  value	
  category	
  indicates	
  that	
  the	
  fund	
  managers	
  in	
  this	
  equity	
  class	
  were	
  able	
  to	
  beat	
  

Such hypotheses are generally supported by my findings. The large

the	
  “uninformed”	
  market	
  after	
  expenses.	
  Generally	
  one	
  can	
  notice	
  that	
  the	
  mean	
  alphas,	
  as	
  

mean alpha in small cap value category indicates that the fund managers in this

indicators	
  of	
  management	
  skill,	
  are	
  on	
  average	
  lower	
  in	
  the	
  large	
  cap	
  segments	
  than	
  in	
  the	
  

equity class were able to beat the “uninformed” market after expenses. Generally

small	
  cap	
  categories.	
  This	
  observation	
  might	
  be	
  partially	
  caused	
  by	
  so	
  called	
  “size	
  effect”	
  which	
  

one can notice that the mean alphas, as indicators of management skill, are on

states	
  that	
  small	
  cap	
  stocks	
  generally	
  outperform	
  large	
  cap	
  stocks.	
  This	
  anomaly	
  to	
  the	
  CAPM	
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model	
  has	
  been	
  widely	
  documented.	
  French	
  and	
  Fama	
  for	
  instance	
  argue	
  that	
  on	
  average	
  

average lower in the large cap segments than in the small cap categories. This
observation might be partially caused by so called “size effect” which states that
small cap stocks generally outperform large cap stocks. This anomaly to the CAPM
model has been widely documented. French and Fama for instance argue that on
average holding small stock enables an investor to capture greater excess returns
than holding other asset classes for any given level of risk (1992). The size effect
represents a premium that is not associated with management skills. Therefore,
the alphas of funds focused on small cap stocks may be overstated. To test this
claim I estimate the CAPM model (1) with SMB as an explanatory variable. The
variable SMB is constant for every year and reflects by how much the small cap
market portfolios, constructed by French and Fama, outperformed the large cap
market portfolios (Kenneth R. French - Data Library). Under such estimation the
disparity among the alphas largely disappears and the alphas become generally
more negative, except for the category large cap growth, where the mean alpha
slightly increases. The results of this estimation are presented in Appendix 3.
Turnover correctly reflects the phenomenon that value investors tend to
wait more and trade less than growth investors. The growth investors believe that
they can frequently trade on certain information even if it is not fully supported
by the fundamentals of the stock (Strong 2004). For these reasons the turnover
of growth funds is generally higher than turnover of value funds. Additionally, I
would expect the mean turnover on the large cap growth category to be the highest
because abundant information that one can trade on is available and because most
day trading strategies focus on this asset class. Nevertheless, this is not the case
and small cap value segment actually displays the highest mean turnover. This
seemingly puzzling fact is not extremely surprising as even the most prominent
researchers fail to reach a consensus regarding the relationship between returns,
asset classes and fund turnover.
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Considering these observations about the actual performance of the
funds over the examined period I further analyze the role that expenses and
turnover play in determination of these returns. I estimate the panel data regression
(2) for each of the fund classes large cap growth (LG), large cap value (LV), small
cap growth (SG) and small cap value (SV) as well as for the entire sample. In the
growth	
  (LG),	
  large	
  cap	
  value	
  (LV),	
  small	
  cap	
  growth	
  (SG)	
  and	
  small	
  cap	
  value	
  (SV)	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  for	
  

estimation for particular fund classes I omit the fund and year dummy variables as
the	
  entire	
  sample.	
  In	
  the	
  estimation	
  for	
  particular	
  fund	
  classes	
  I	
  omit	
  the	
  fund	
  and	
  year	
  dummy	
  

most of the dummy variables would be dropped due to collinearly. Nevertheless,
variables	
  as	
  most	
  of	
  the	
  dummy	
  variables	
  would	
  be	
  dropped	
  due	
  to	
  collinearly.	
  Nevertheless,	
  

for the overall sample I run regressions both with (Overall 1) and without (Overall
for	
  the	
  overall	
  sample	
  I	
  run	
  regressions	
  both	
  with	
  (Overall	
  1)	
  and	
  without	
  (Overall	
  2)	
  the	
  

2) the dummy variables. Additionally, I employ HAC standard errors in all my
dummy	
  variables.	
  Additionally,	
  I	
  employ	
  HAC	
  standard	
  errors	
  in	
  all	
  my	
  estimations	
  because	
  my	
  

estimations because my sample suffers from severe heteroscedasticity. The results
sample	
  suffers	
  from	
  severe	
  heteroscedasticity.	
  The	
  results	
  are	
  presented	
  in	
  Table	
  6.	
  

are presented in Table 6.
	
  

Table	
  6	
  
Estimated	
  Coefficients	
  by	
  Categories:	
  
Dependent	
  variable:	
  Exreturn	
  =	
  Rjt	
  –	
  Rft	
  
	
  

	
  

	
   Overall	
  1	
  

LG	
  

LV	
  

SG	
  

BMktRf	
  

1.00**	
  
(0.008)	
  

1.00**	
  
(0.007)	
  

1.00**	
  
(0.012)	
  

1.00**	
  
(0.022)	
  

1.00**	
  
(0.054)	
  

1.00**	
  
(0.006)	
  

Expenses	
  

-‐1.14**	
  
(0.391)	
  

-‐0.50*	
  
(0.291)	
  

0.74	
  
(1.456)	
  

0.00	
  
(1.257)	
  

3.89	
  
(2.819)	
  

0.12	
  
(0.701)	
  

Turnover	
  

0.00	
  
(0.002)	
  

0.00	
  
(0.002)	
  

0.00	
  
(0.002)	
  

0.00	
  
(0.005)	
  

0.00	
  
(0.003)	
  

0.00	
  
(0.001)	
  

	
  

SV	
  

	
  
Overall	
  2	
  

	
  
**	
  Statistically	
  significant	
  at	
  95%	
  confidence	
  level	
  
*	
  Statistically	
  significant	
  at	
  90%	
  confidence	
  level	
  
In	
  parenthesis:	
  Standard	
  Errors	
  
	
  
Overall	
  1:	
  Dummy	
  variables	
  for	
  years	
  and	
  funds	
  were	
  employed	
  
Overall	
  2:	
  No	
  dummy	
  variables	
  were	
  employed	
  

	
  
	
  

Several important observations arise from the results. The coefficient

Several	
  important	
  observations	
  arise	
  from	
  the	
  results.	
  The	
  coefficient	
  on	
  BMktRf,	
  

on BMktRf, which represents the CAPM market premium (Rmt – Rft) multiplied
which	
  represents	
  the	
  CAPM	
  market	
  premium	
  (Rmt	
  –	
  Rft)	
  multiplied	
  by	
  the	
  previously	
  estimated	
  

by the previously estimated beta of the fund, is not statistically significant in
beta	
  of	
  the	
  fund,	
  is	
  not	
  statistically	
  significant	
  in	
  difference	
  from	
  one.	
  This	
  is	
  exactly	
  what	
  I	
  

difference from one. This is exactly what I expected because beta is originally
expected	
  because	
  beta	
  is	
  originally	
  estimated	
  as	
  a	
  coefficient	
  on	
  MktRf.	
  Thus	
  there	
  will	
  likely	
  be	
  

estimated as a coefficient on MktRf. Thus there will likely be a one to one
relationship between BMktRf and excess returns.
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24	
  

In the regressions for the entire sample, the coefficients on expenses are
statistically insignificant in difference from zero which supports my hypothesis
that the impact of expenses is in essence neutral (H3: e = 0). The coefficients
obtained from the sub-samples of asset classes are in size similar to the coefficient
on estimation with no dummy variables. Therefore, it appears that the relatively
high coefficient on expenses in estimation of Overall 1 is purely due to the
inclusion of dummy variables for years and funds.
More interestingly, the coefficient e is negative and statistically significant
in difference from zero in the large cap categories while remaining insignificant in
the small cap categories. This finding supports the proposed theory that the lack
of readily available information in the small cap categories increases the marginal
returns on information and consequently enables managers to offset their research
and management expenses by resulting higher returns. In contrary, it seems that,
in the large cap segment, research and active trading that drive expenses are likely
to lower the net returns of the funds, which supports the EMH. These findings
are not impacted by the size effect and hold among several model specifications.
Turnover seems to be almost perfectly neutral across the entire sample
and the sub-categories because the estimated coefficients are indistinguishable
from zero. This would imply that the amount of trading itself does not have a
substantial impact on the returns. Additionally, turnover is a proxy for trading
expenses that are already incorporated in the expense ratios. Therefore, as I have
noted before, one may expect high correlation between the variables turnover
and expenses. Nevertheless, the relatively low correlation coefficient of these
variables (0.17) indicates that most of the expenses are due to research and
management fees rather than trading expenses. In future, it would be beneficial to
obtain data for management fees and expenses separately as this would strengthen
my inference from the empirical results.
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Conclusion
Combining the analysis of individual fund and market performance, it
is clear that most of the funds across different asset classes neither substantially
outperformed nor underperformed the market on risk-adjusted basis during the
period 2002-2009. I document that although this was true for a majority of the
funds, some asset classes yielded greater risk adjusted excess returns than others.
In fact, the estimation of individual fund’s alphas indicates that funds in the small
cap categories outperformed those in the large cap segment of the market on risk
adjusted basis. This could be caused by the fact that small stock tends to generate
greater returns than other asset classes, for any given level of risk. This so called
“size effect” is confirmed by my empirical analysis and artificially inflates the
alphas of managers who focus on small cap stocks. Using the French and Fama
methodology, I find that the differences in alphas diminish after I account for the
size effect. This suggests that, abstracting from the size effect, the managers on
average performed comparatively well in all of the categories.
Nevertheless, even after I account for the size effect, the key result
indicated by my analysis remains unchanged: Contrary to a popular public view,
there does not seem to be a negative relationship between expenses and returns
net of fees. The estimated coefficient on expenses that is indistinguishable from
zero suggests that the mutual funds on average spend their resources efficiently.
In other words fund expenses that generally increase due to research and active
management are at least offset by resulting higher returns. This observation
holds across all estimations presented in this study and is theoretically justifiable
assuming existence of costly information in financial markets.
However, several interesting exceptions arise from the estimations of
particular sub-classes. I document a significant negative impact of expenses on
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excess returns in the large cap categories, while observing a non-negative effect
in the small cap categories. This finding remains unaffected even after accounting
for the size effect, suggesting its relative strength.
Therefore, I conclude that, although the semi-strong EMH holds in most
cases, the managers focusing on asset classes with low availability of information
may experience high returns to information and consequently outperform the
market before expenses. In addition, my empirical analysis indicates expenditure
efficiency, suggesting that the overall mutual fund market as well as its small cap
segment is in a relative informational equilibrium. In such equilibrium the traders
carry out just enough research that its marginal cost equals marginal benefit of the
information gained.
On the other hand, the large cap class of the mutual fund market does
not appear to be in such equilibrium. I find that in this category the increased
expenses negatively contribute to the fund returns. Therefore, in large cap, more
research and management is unlikely to increase returns. In fact, greater active
management is likely to be counterproductive and so I hold that the large cap
funds are not spending their resources efficiently. To bring this market segment
into equilibrium, rational agents would cut their expenses, decrease the amount of
research and human capital they employ or would focus on more profitable market
segments. It seems reasonable to believe that the reasons why this has not been the
case lie in the problems of imperfect information and bounded rationality. Future
research should focus on such differences between the two markets segments and
should identify any conditions specific to the large cap funds that could reconcile
this disparity.
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Friedrich von Hayek:
The Socialist-Calculation Debate, Knowledge Arguments,
And Modern Economic Development
Cara Elliott

Introduction
At the close of the nineteenth and the commencement of the twentieth
century, socialism began to gain momentum as a large-scale movement in Europe
and the United States. This popularity was supported by an increased influence of
the working class in society, which put pressure for representation upon European
parliaments and began to secure concrete improvements in labor protection laws
(Backhouse, 2002: 269). Moreover, socialist proponents looked hopefully towards
the living example of the Soviet Union, which began its socialist experiment
in 1917 following the success of the Bolshevik Revolution. Socialism, which
found its economic grounding in the legacies of such men as David Ricardo and
Karl Marx, tended to encourage a more central and vital role for government
intervention in the economy. Thus economists who favored a socialist-oriented
change in contemporary societies began to develop theories intended to address
such issues as “where, when and how the state should intervene in economic life”
(Backhouse, 2002: 269) and how societies might be successfully reorganized so
as to be based upon these new precepts.
These developing theories contrasted with those of the opposition
contingent of both past and contemporary economists. As a result, a rich discourse
of opposing ideologies appeared in the early decades of the twentieth century,
coming from such men as Otto Neurath, Henry D. Dickinson, Maurice Dobb,
and Oskar Lange on the socialist side, and Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von
Hayek on the opposing. The debates, which focused on such subjects as the role
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of the competitive market, central planning boards, prices, and entrepreneurial
knowledge, were valuable to the participants not only in terms of their motives,
which were often political, but also in that the very nature of the debates
continuously challenged the economists and their theories. This encouraged
deeper analysis, understanding, and innovation in the theories developed by
economists on both sides of the dispute, allowing for stronger and more refined
arguments. Oskar Lange himself, when speaking about a challenge made to
socialist theories by Ludwig von Mises, wrote, “Socialists have certainly good
reason to be grateful to Professor Mises, the great advocatus diaboli of their
cause. For it was his powerful challenge that forced the socialists to recognize
the . . . very existence of . . . a problem [in the system]” (Lange, 1938: 57).
The theories that appeared at this time, especially with regards to Friedrich von
Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments,” caused significant intellectual reverberations
that continue to have implications in the socialist debate and economic discipline
as a whole in recent economic dialogues.
Hayek’s arguments are especially significant in their challenge to the
traditional neoclassical conception of static equilibrium and of perfectly
informed, uniform actors in a free-market economy that has “reached” this state
of equilibrium. Hayek’s contribution is in conceptualizing a dynamic, consistently
changing equilibrium that responds to and thus account more effectively the actions
of individuals in those economies. This conceptualization allows economists to
visualize and analyze market economies in a much more dynamic fashion and is
particularly vital with regards to the current state of affairs in free-market societies
worldwide. The world is in the midst of a charged atmosphere still experiencing
the shocks of the 2008 financial crisis, the essential collapse of countries such as
Greece and Ireland last year, and a generally pessimistic attitude about the ability
for Western, free-market economies, especially the United States, to continue to
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compete with countries experiencing growth at exponential rates, particularly
China, a country that continues to follow a socialist model – albeit an evolved,
complex one. The significance of Hayek’s arguments will not be in their ability to
be any sort of band-aid to solve the Western world’s problems. However, they are
also challenging, thought-provoking, and non-traditional arguments which could
exist in a larger forum of debate and exchange that focuses upon forward-thinking
economic theories that could help to revitalize stagnant or struggling free-market
economies in the modern world.
This paper will explore, first, the “socialist-calculation debate” of the
early decades of the twentieth century between such scholars as Ludwig von
Mises, Oskar Lange, and Friedrich von Hayek. One product of that debate was
Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments,” which will be the second topic of focus in the
paper. Finally, the third section of the paper will demonstrate different examples
of theories developed in various economics circles in recent years, with special
attention to those who claim foundation in Hayek’s work. These papers studied
in this section include Israel M. Kirzner’s “Entrepreneurial Discovery and the
Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach” (1997) and Fikret Adaman
and Pat Devine’s “On the Economic Theory of Socialism” (1997).

The Socialist-Calculation Debate
The Socialist-Calculation Debate, consisting of a series of arguments on
the subject of the “possibility of a rational economic calculation in a socialist
economic system” (Adaman and Devine, 1997: 55), opened with Enrico Barone’s
1908 paper “The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State,” which outlined
a mathematical model for a collectivist state, and continued into the 1920s and
1930s with the opposing literature of the Austrian and Socialist schools (Adaman
and Devine, 1997: 55).
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German Literature, 1920s
In 1920, Ludwig von Mises began the “German-language” segment of
the debate with his “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,”
originally published in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften 1920, which challenged
a number of proposed socialist models (Mises, 1972: 75-91). Mises sought to
respond especially to Otto Neurath, who had written a paper in 1919 outlining
a calculation theory based upon the example given by “war economy.” Neurath
argued that during wartime, government assumes responsibility for the planning
of material distribution, suppressing the market price system characteristic of
peacetime. Moreover, production in wartime is not profit-seeking – which “leads
to recurrent periods of over-production and unemployment” (Caldwell, 1997:
1859) – but rather works to achieve maximum productive capacity. Neurath
asserted that the “central planning” that occurred during war should continue
during peace, with the government acting as a central “giant enterprise” (Caldwell,
1997: 1859). He then went so far as to argue that money would be unnecessary in
this new society in which “production would be driven by objectively determined
needs rather than the search for profits . . . [and] all calculation regarding the
appropriate levels of inputs and output could be handled in ‘natural’ physical
terms” (Caldwell, 1997: 1859).
Mises, a monetary theorist, especially disagreed with Neurath in terms of
his plans for the dissolution of the monetary system, mentioning that, as money
serves as a uniform means of exchange across different factors of production, “for
the practical purposes of life monetary calculation always suffices. Were we to
dispense with it, any economic system of calculation would become absolutely
impossible” (Mises, 1972: 79). However, he also hoped to outline an obstacle for
the conceptualization of the socialist order with or without the existence of money,
so his response to Neurath went on to provide a model in which socialist states’
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ownership of capital, or factors of production, was assumed, therefore negating
any competitive market for these goods. Mises saw this inclination as making it
difficult, or perhaps impossible, for socialist states to assign value to inputs, and,
thus, outputs (Caldwell, 1997: 1859). Essentially, without a competitive market,
which, through the processes of supply and demand naturally and continuously
determines prices and acts as an economic calculator of sorts, Mises argued, “in the
socialist commonwealth every economic change becomes an undertaking whose
success can be neither appraised in advance nor later retrospectively determined.
There is only groping in the dark. Socialism is the abolition of rational economy”
(Mises, 1972: 80).

English Literature, 1930s
In the following decade, partly in response to a popular shift towards
socialist thought that occurred in Britain as demonstrated by a variety of groups,
including political and labor parties as well as academics (Caldwell, 1997: 185960), English literature took up the debate. Friedrich von Hayek, who was at the
forefront of this movement, built and elaborated upon arguments begun by Ludwig
von Mises during the 1920s and formulated a series of critiques of socialism,
addressing in his works the arguments of such men as Henry D. Dickinson and
Maurice Dobb, and later, Oskar Lange. One of Hayek’s first obstacles was to
tackle Dickinson’s proposal of the possibility of mathematical calculation to
determine values in a socialist society through the employment of Léon Walras’
system of equations and the utilization of the “auctioneer.” In Dickinson’s plan,
a central planning board using this “Walrasian set of equations” would take on
the function of the market as the determinant of prices (Caldwell, 1997: 1860).
Hayek, in response, outlined a variety of issues with Dickinson’s system: first,
the collection and processing of large amounts of necessary information; second,
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the difficulty associated with formulating and solving the required equations;
and, third, the static nature of such a system and its inability to compete with the
natural adaptations of a free market (Caldwell, 1997: 1860).
Hayek continued this trend of underlining the difficulties associated with
suggested socialist solutions in his critique of Maurice Dobb’s contention that “if
consumption decisions were subjected to central control, most of the problems
associated with central planning would be alleviated” (Caldwell, 1997: 1861).
Hayek rejected this claim, arguing that this change would likely be unacceptable
to a society such as Great Britain, or others like it, which was accustomed to
a system of consumer freedom. Also in this critique, Hayek addressed “market
socialism,” which had not been concretely proposed as yet but was in theory an
alternative to what its adherents saw as a distorted capitalist system, in which
the market was no longer truly free or competitive, but rather dominated by
corporations and monopolies (Caldwell, 1997: 1861). By imagining a system
in which “managers of monopolized industries [would be] directed to produce
so that prices covered marginal costs . . . duplicating the results of competitive
equilibrium,” (Caldwell, 1997: 1861) Hayek addressed a few issues which,
at that point, were rather underdeveloped, but which he would go on to better
conceptualize in his later works. These obstacles were the difficulty for a socialist
order to replace entrepreneurs acting in a free market, and the issue of managerial
incentives in a society that was not profit-oriented (Caldwell, 1997: 1861).

The Lange Debates On Market Socialism
Oskar Lange, a Polish immigrant based in the United States, also wrote
on the subject of market socialism; however, he acted as its ardent advocate,
entering the discourse during the latter half of the 1930s to respond first to Mises
and later to Hayek. In his paper “On the Economic Theory of Socialism,” first
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published in Review of Economic Studies in 1936-7, and again as a book in 1938,
Lange’s framework proposed a free market for both consumer goods and labor
in conjunction with public ownership of capital and other means of production,
which he argued would reduce – although not eliminate – social gaps, given the
lack of income disparity that originates in private capital ownership (Lange, 1972:
92-3). Lange’s model required given prices determined by a Central Planning
Board so as to allow for a “subjective equilibrium condition” in which there
is a “combination of factors which minimizes average cost, [a level of] output
which equalizes marginal cost and the price of the product, and the best allocation
of the ultimate productive resources” (Lange, 1972: 97). Lange’s model then
necessarily rejected Mises’ argument that the market must be the determinant of
prices, arguing instead that the “parametric function of prices” which occurs in
competitive markets is retained in a system of fixed prices (Lange, 1972: 98-9).
Lange’s paper also addressed and refuted Hayek’s computation argument (in
which Hayek outlined the difficulty of computation given the breadth of required
information for equations and subsequent issue of solving those equations).
Lange claimed that “the only equations which would have to be ‘solved’ would
be those of the consumers and the managers of production” whereby, to solve
these equations, consumers need only to spend their income and managers of
production need only to produce at those levels determined by the equilibrium
requirements as previously defined in this section (Lange, 1972: 103). Moreover,
those prices required by the managers of production to determine their production
levels should be subject to a “trial and error” method of adjustment for price
finding, in which the prices are raised or lowered according to whether there is a
surplus or shortage of their respective goods. Given their broader knowledge base
and attention to the market, Lange believed the Central Planning Board setting the
prices and making the necessary adjustments would actually be better suited for
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this role than private entrepreneurs, allowing for a shorter process of movement
towards equilibrium than occurred the competitive market (Lange, 1972: 103104).
While Mises never explicitly responded to Lange’s challenge, he continued
to reject socialist proposals in his writings, focusing on refuting the socialist
proposition of a centrally planned mechanism for determining prices. He saw
prices as having a very specific determinant; that is, “‘[prices are] brought
about by the interplay of the valuations of all individuals participating in the
operation of the market’” (Mises, 1966: 331, cf. Caldwell, 1997: 1863). This
entrepreneurially-based scope allowed for an adaptive market that socialism
simply could not reproduce as “the ever-changing structure of prices that exists
within a market system, the messy groping that appears so archaic, ends up
being a passably efficient system for revealing relative scarcities” (Caldwell,
1997: 1863). In this system, the entrepreneur is “the essential actor of the piece”
(Caldwell, 1997: 1863) reacting to and, in fact, causing changes in the market;
for example, “where shortages have existed . . . the resulting price increases
[are] driven by entrepreneurs recognizing, in the face of the uncertainty of the
real world, the profit opportunities available” (Kirzner, 1997: 70). According to
Mises, the competitive market system, which tends to include explicit private
property laws and a propensity towards profit-maximizing actions, is a necessary
prerequisite to the role of Mises’ entrepreneur, therefore, in socialist economies,
the equilibrating actions of the entrepreneur would be null and void.
Hayek, like Mises, continued to write arguments against socialist systems,
and, in his own response to Lange, not only made use of his earlier addressed
objections to the mathematical calculation system proposed by Dickinson, but also
outlined new issues, such as the nature of equilibrium and the role of knowledge
in the market.
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Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments
Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments,” a series of papers published in the
late 1930s and throughout the 1940s, explored the nature of equilibrium and
especially the process by which that state is reached, and, in so doing, issued a
challenge to both traditional assumptions about static equilibrium and socialist
theorists. His argument focused on the role of knowledge in competitive markets,
responding directly to Lange’s contention that a Central Planning Board would
better determine prices than individuals participating in a naturally fluctuating
free market. Many scholars have asserted that the arguments presented in these
pieces were “seminal . . . both in development of Hayek’s ideas and in [their]
implications for the calculation debate” (Caldwell, 1997: 1865). His ideas were
first presented in his 1937 “Economics and Knowledge,” and were further refined
and developed in later works such as his 1945 “The Use of Knowledge in Society.”

“Economics and Knowledge,” 1937
“Economics and Knowledge,” which was featured in a 1937 issue of
Economica, sought to outline a more definite and clear concept of equilibrium.
Essential to this concept was Hayek’s departure from a “pure theory of stationary
equilibrium,” which neither accounts for change nor for time and also assumes
uniform, perfect knowledge among individuals, making the models based upon
these premises inapplicable to real world situations. Hayek’s study of knowledge,
denoted as “data,” begins with a distinction between “objective real facts, as the
observing economist is supposed to know them,” and “subjective [data] as things
known to the persons whose behavior we try to explain” (Hayek, 1937: 39).
Thus, a state of equilibrium only lasts so long as the “external data correspond to
the common experiences of all the members of the society” (Hayek, 1937: 41).
Understanding equilibrium in this manner breaks the restraints of stationary models
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and allows for equilibrium analysis to be applied to more realistic, “progressive”
society. Also important to this line of argument, however, is Hayek’s careful
mention that his distinction does not intend to imply that there is not a relationship
between subjective data, or individual plans, and objective data, or external facts.
Rather, “subjective data of different people [would never] correspond unless they
were due to the experience of the same objective facts” (Hayek, 1937: 43).
Furthermore, this correspondence of knowledge and intentions by
entrepreneurs in the market as Hayek understands it is an evolutionary process
with a consistent tendency towards equilibrium as economic actors “come more
and more into agreement . . . [or] become more and more correct” (Hayek, 1937:
44). This tendency, (which does not necessarily ever lead to an absolute state
of equilibrium) or the process “by which individual knowledge is changed,” is
Hayek’s next subject. He asserts that economists should remember “how little
we actually know about the conditions under which an equilibrium will ever be
reached” (Hayek, 1937: 48). This limitation derives from a “‘constancy of the
data’” as a condition of equilibrium. This constancy does not exist in the real world,
as individuals consistently change their expectations and subsequent actions “as
they gain experience about the external facts and other people’s actions,” leading
to a continuous and seemingly infinite process of changes (Hayek, 1937: 47-8).
While this process is of interest to Hayek, it is in the ensuing analysis of
the nature of knowledge – “how much and what sort different individuals possess”
– that his most interesting insights come to light (Hayek, 1937: 48). He begins
by assuming individually “‘relevant knowledge,’” which, when taken together,
allow for a “spontaneous interaction of a number of people, each possessing only
bits of knowledge, [to] bring about a state of affairs in which prices correspond
to costs” – in other words, a “Division of Knowledge” similar in function to the
much-studied division of labor (Hayek, 1937: 49, emphasis in the original). This
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knowledge, is, again, consistently changing as individuals become aware of new
facts. It is a learning process that may occur either completely by accident or
through the unexpected results of any executed action. Therefore, “it is only
relative to the knowledge which a person is bound to acquire in the course of the
carrying out of his original plan and its successive alteration that an equilibrium
is likely to be reached” (Hayek, 1937: 51). In other words, Hayek argued that a
greater understanding and, moreover, refinement of this “division of knowledge”
theory would allow for economists to better comprehend the equilibrating nature
of the market. Hayek saw this issue as the
central question of all social sciences, how the combination of fragments
of knowledge existing in different minds can bring about results which,
if they were to be brought about deliberately, would require a knowledge
on the part of the directing mind which no single person can possess. To
show that in this sense the spontaneous action of individuals will under
conditions which we can define bring about a distribution of resources
which can be understood as if it were made according to a single plan,
although nobody has planned it, seems to me indeed an answer to the
problem which has sometimes been metaphorically described as that of
the ‘social mind’ (Hayek, 1937: 52).
Hayek concludes that, economists, then, should attempt to find a way to
deliberately put to use all of this knowledge so as to better fathom the evolutionary
process of equilibrium and to formulate a model which would, in application,
allow for a closer state of absolute equilibrium than present models and states.
Hayek continued to refine these theories in the next few years of his career, and
thus Hayek’s later work, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” delves deeper into,
and therefore more clearly expresses, the arguments formed in the 1937 paper.

“The Use of Knowledge In Society,” 1945
Published in the fall 1945 issue of The American Economic Review,
“The Use of Knowledge in Society” begins by asking the question, “What
is the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational economic
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order?” (Hayek, 1945: 519). Hayek, in contrast to the traditional practice of
seeking to solve this economic calculation problem by employing a system of
given preferences and perfect knowledge, underscores that a proposed calculation
which at least attempts to be applicable to society must make use of the “dispersed
bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate
individuals possess” (Hayek, 1945: 519). This problem naturally deals with the
concept of planning – in the traditional definition of the word, taken to mean the
decisions pertaining to the allocation of resources within a society – and, more
specifically, the “planners” making those decisions. The debate, then, over the
advantages of either central planning, in which there is one plan determined from
above, or competition, in which there is decentralized planning by many different
individuals acting in the market, should be resolved by answering the question
of which system makes better use of this dispersed knowledge. In order to make
this determination, a better definition of the different kinds knowledge and their
relative significances is required.
Hayek differentiates between scientific knowledge and tacit knowledge,
defining the former as “those which we should with greater confidence expect to
find in the possession of an authority made up of suitably chosen experts” and
the latter as “more likely to be at the disposal of particular individuals . . . the
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” (Hayek, 1945: 521).
While greater emphasis is generally placed upon scientific knowledge, Hayek
argues that tacit knowledge should hold equal import given that “practically
every individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique
information of which beneficial use might be made” (Hayek, 1945: 522). This
information is formed by way of a wide array of sources, such as popular or
localized publications or advertisements; isolated interactions between
entrepreneurs; or individual desires – all “special knowledge of circumstances of
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the fleeting moment not known to others” (Hayek, 1945: 522). Moreover, through
the process of acting in the competitive market, knowledge is consistently and
continuously changing, constituting an ongoing discovery process. The nature of
tacit knowledge, then, is such that it cannot be expressed numerically, making it
impossible to integrate in a calculation-based socialist order, while at the same
time acting as a natural component of a responsive capitalist system (Hayek,
1945: 524).
The second half of Hayek’s 1945 paper focuses upon arguments in support
of the price mechanism. Hayek argues that prices function not only a medium of
exchange but also as a conveyor of information. They are a “kind of machinery for
registering change, or a system of telecommunications which enables individual
producers to watch merely the movement of a few pointers . . . in order to adjust
their activities to changes of which they may never know more than is reflected in
the price movement” (Hayek, 1945: 527). The nature of the price mechanism is
one the primary tenets of Hayek’s argument against those who would advocate for
“‘conscious direction,’” (central planners or socialist economists) because one of
the most miraculous features of the price mechanism is that it has “evolved without
design” (Hayek, 1945: 527). In this sense, it is one of many social institutions
which could not be instantaneously replicated, or worse, replaced with different
systems, because they exist as part of an evolutionary process consisting of many
generations of improvements and development in which success is achieved “by
building upon habits and institutions which have proved successful in their own
sphere and which have in turn become the foundation of the civilization we have
built up . . . [having originally] stumbled upon [them] without understanding”
(Hayek, 1945: 528).
From Hayek’s perspective, then, the socialist proposal was doomed
from the start, because it intended to transform society at its very roots, therefore
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undermining and, in fact, nullifying those evolutionary processes Hayek outlined.
The contemporary implications of Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments” were
therefore not small; he underscored an issue for both mainstream and alternative
school proponents by challenging traditional equilibrium assumptions as well as
outlining a system in which the applicability and efficiency of socialist models
could not compare to competitive market processes which encouraged the best
utilization of dispersed knowledge. The exact nature and significance of these
implications continue to be debated and built upon in modern economic circles.
Modern Implications of the Knowledge Arguments
The concepts expressed in Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments – dispersed
knowledge among individuals; the discovery process surrounding that knowledge
in a competitive market setting; the nature and role of tacit knowledge; and the
function of prices as conveyors of information about the market – have been
significant in different ways for different schools of modern economists.

The Austrian School
The modern Austrian school’s conceptualization of the market is
influenced by both Mises’ lesson of the market being driven by profit-oriented
entrepreneurs as well as Hayek’s contribution of an understanding of the role,
nature and continuous augmentation of knowledge in the market (Kirnzer,
1997: 67). Additionally, Austrians have learned to appreciate the function of
competition with regards Hayek’s discovery procedure in that “for the modern
Austrian approach, this perception of competition as the dynamic, driving force
for discovery in the market process has become central” (Kirzner, 1997: 69). The
Austrian School, then, represents a break with standard neoclassical economics
in that the Austrians do not see the static equilibrium model that focuses its
interest on the endpoint as being sufficient to explain or understand what happens
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in actual market economies. Moreover, while neoclassical economics no longer
tends to adhere to the time-honored assumption of perfect information, it has done
comparatively little to address the role of the discovery process as outlined in
Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments.
In this sense, the Austrian school’s work exists as the most orthodox
modern application of Hayek’s theories, as Hayek’s “idea that ‘the pure theory
of stationary equilibrium’ is inadequate as a tool for understanding the workings
of a market economy, and that it should be replaced by a view of the market
as a competitive-entrepreneurial process for the discovery and coordination of
knowledge, has become a central tenet of Austrian thought” (Caldwell, 1997:
1866). The Austrian school is the best representation of Hayek’s legacy within
modern economic circles, and it is the only school that employs Hayek’s arguments
together in understanding the market, equilibrium, and the processes behind each
of these phenomena.

The Socialist School
The Knowledge Arguments have been significant for modern socialist
economists as well, especially for those that have made attempts to reconcile
Hayek’s arguments with socialist systems. For example, in Fikret Adaman and
Pat Devine’s “On the Economic Theory of Socialism,” printed in a 1997 issue of
New Left Review, the authors advocate for a system of participatory planning, in
which “the values of individuals and collectives interact and shape one another
through a process of cooperation and negotiation . . . [enabling] tacit knowledge
to be articulated and economic life to be consciously controlled and coordinated”
(Adaman and Devine, 1997: 75). Their proposed model differentiates between
“market exchange” and “market forces,” in which market exchange is taken to
mean “‘transactions between buyers and sellers’” and market forces refers to
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“‘the process whereby changes are brought about in the underlying allocation of
resources, the relative size of different industries, the geographical distribution
of economic activity” (Devine, 1992: 79-80, cf. Adaman and Devine, 1997: 76).
Market exchange, then, encourages information to be generated through
the participation of individuals acting in the market, which then makes the best use
of existing productive capacity while also determining any necessary changes that
will need to be made in the structure of that capacity for better future usage. Market
forces, on the other hand, will not be incorporated into the participatory setting,
planned instead from above. Through this combination of free participation in the
market with planning from above, the authors attempt to express a model in which
Hayek’s concept of tacit knowledge can, in fact, be incorporated into a socialist
economy. The issue with this model is that Hayek’s concept of an individual acting
in the market resembles Mises’ profit-motivated entrepreneur, and so does not
tend, as in Adaman and Devine’s model, to “promote cooperation and recognition
of interdependent common interest” (Adaman and Devine, 1997: 78), but rather
makes choices that are motivated by profit (Kirzner, 1997: 78). This orientation
towards profit is the driving force behind Hayek’s discovery process, thus, while
Adaman and Devine’s system accounts for tacit knowledge, it still misses some
of Hayek’s main points.
Adaman and Devine, however, differ from many other socialist
economists in at least seeking to integrate Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments
into their models. There have been a variety of other socialist models recently
proposed which do not take into account the insights of Hayek’s work, especially
ignoring the role of tacit knowledge. One of these models is outlined in Pranab
Bardhan and John Roemer’s work, expressed in such papers as their 1992
“Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation,” which focuses on the issues of
calculation and motivation instead of knowledge, and, through a “bank-centric
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system of insider monitoring” seeks to solve the managerial motivation problem
(Bardhan and Roemer, 1992: 105). Echoing Oskar Lange’s claims, their system’s
“main bank and the group partners . . . have more “inside” information . . . [and]
are likely to be capable of detecting . . . trouble more easily than a diffuse body
of stockholders” (Bardhan and Roemer, 1992: 109). In this sense, Bardhan and
Roemer outline a model which may seem applicable to real world situations, but,
like Lange before them, do not account for the role of knowledge as expressed by
Hayek in their work. The differences between Adaman and Devine and Bardhan
and Roemer’s theories, which both exist in the realm of market socialist theories,
illustrate the nature of the debate that surrounds socialism today, even from within,
as socialist economists continue to search for a working model which accounts for
their opponents’ challenges.

Conclusion
Friedrich von Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments stand as both some of his
most insightful and significant work as well as noteworthy developments in the
greater scope of economic thought as a whole. They had implications both within
Hayek’s own contemporary economic circles, especially with regards to the
socialist-calculation debate, and continue to influence economic theorists today.
The propagation of Hayek’s concepts is particularly evident in the “alternative”
Austrian school of thought, which, like Hayek, challenges neoclassical standards
to move closer to real world situations so as to create applicable, working models
for market economies. Also notable, modern socialist economists such as Fikret
Adaman and Pat Devine have worked to address Hayek’s theories, attempting to
integrate at least some of the ideas into a workable socialist model.
This continuing debate mirrors that of the development of the Knowledge
Arguments themselves. Hayek was a key economist among those participating
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in the socialist-calculation debate, and, therefore, it follows that the Arguments
developed as a product of that debate, in one of his many attempts to challenge
his opponents. As Israel Kirzner maintains, the socialist-calculation debate was
a “catalyst in the development and articulation of the modern Austrian view as a
competitive-entrepreneurial process of discovery . . . it was through the give-andtake of this debate that the Austrians gradually refined their own position” (Kirzner,
1988: 1, cf. Lavoie, 1985, cf. Caldwell, 1997: 1861) In this sense, the evolution of
the Knowledge Arguments demonstrates a broader tendency of economists to rely
upon debates within and between different circles of thought to better develop
their theories and, ultimately, to come to a more complete understanding of the
world around them, and, more importantly, apply that understanding with the
hopes of improving that world.
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History of Usury
The Transition of Usury Through Ancient Greece, The Rise of
Christianity and Islam, And the Expansion of
Long-Distance Trade and Capitalism
Cheryl Olechnowicz

Introduction to Usury
Society and its ideas, markets, and institutions are in the constant process
of change. These transforming factors contribute to the evolution of economics.
Usury is one prominent economic issue that demonstrates this evolution. As it has
developed, usury, the lending of money at interest or excessive interest, has been
debated for almost two millennia (Visser, 1998, Usury).
During the lifetime of Aristotle, 384-322 B.C., the lending of money
for profit was believed to be unnatural and dishonorable (Madra, 2010, Ancient
Greece). Aristotle and his beliefs of usury provided a foundation of ideas for future
perspectives on the practice. This negative connotation associated with usury
continued in history as is evident in the development and spread of Christianity and
Islam during the Middle Ages. The Christian church drew on biblical passages and
moral and religious reasons to define usury as a sin. The Church placed a ban on the
practice of usury to prevent this “evil”. In Islam, the Quran and the teachings of the
Prophet Muhammad led Muslims to also view usury as a crime.
As the world has developed, usury has lost its negative connotation in
the West and has become a social norm. The Christian church has lifted its ban
on usury while a gradual decrease of the importance of religion is seen. Longdistance trade has developed which also contributes to the increasing emergence
of usury. The expanse of trade has led to more people being involved in the market
and the augmentation of new ideas on usury.
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The rise of capitalism too has affected societies’ views of usury. Capitalism
does incur the making of self-profit as well as rates of interest. Both of these would
have been looked down upon in Aristotle’s time and the Middle Ages. In the present
however, the West has grown accustomed to capitalism. Interest rates do not carry
any negative connotation and usury is no longer considered a sin.
The Christian church and Islam both drew on Aristotle’s beliefs on usury
to help develop their own disapproving views of the practice. However, as time
passed, society developed economically and socially and the Church lifted its
ban on usury. Islam has developed as well, yet it still continues to view usury as
detrimental to society. The debate on usury has witnessed countless arguments
over the past two millenniums, and it will continue to perceive them due to varying
opinions and the religious passages in the Bible and the Quran.

History of Usury
Aristotle was revered for his contributions to philosophy and economics.
His writings and ideas on usury were significant in Ancient Greece and his
influence continues to be seen today. Aristotle distinguished between natural and
unnatural exchange to define his view on usury. Natural and unnatural exchange
is also known as arête (the art of being a good citizen) versus chrematistike (the
acquisition of wealth) (Madra, 2010, Ancient Greece).
The discrepancy between the two types of exchange heavily influenced
people’s thought in Ancient Greece and the Middle Ages. As time progressed, this
difference became less important, and it ultimately contributed to a less critical
view of usury. On this distinction of exchange he says the following:
“There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of
household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable,
while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and
a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the
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greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from
the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to
increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from
money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the
parent. Wherefore of a modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural” (Aristotle,
mid 300 B.C., cited from Medema, 2003, Excerpts from Politics).
To understand the quote one must comprehend the Greek polis; or an
independent city state where the citizens have a large role in their public life
(Backhouse, 2002, p. 23). In order to survive and carry out their civic role, the
citizens required materials to continue living on their estate. This was termed
“household management” which was considered to be perfectly natural exchange.
The people did take part in trade, however only for necessary items they could not
produce themselves. This is the reason Aristotle terms natural trade “necessary
and honorable” (Aristotle, mid 300 B.C., cited from Medema, 2003, Excerpts
from Politics).
People involved in this household management therefore had a limit on
the natural amount of wealth they could accumulate. The ultimate goal for the
Ancient Greeks was to obtain the “good life” which entailed being a citizen of
the polis (which as explained above entailed household management). Aristotle
believed in this good life and urged people to acquire it.
Unnatural trade involved one person benefiting from another, an action
viewed as usury. The excessive accumulation of wealth solely for profit was
considered abnormal and ethically wrong. One would be acting rationally for
their “self interest”. If in doing so, one disregards others, then acting in “self
interest” is viewed as wrong.
The Greeks viewed usury as the “most hated sort” of trade (Aristotle, mid
300 B.C., cited from Medema, 2003, Excerpts from Politics). Lending money at
a high interest rate was using money to make a profit. This was frowned upon
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because money was meant to be used for exchange, not for making more money.
Aristotle viewed unnatural exchange as a producer of avarice which led to social
problems (Kozel, 2006, p.20) He believed that people obsessed with attaining
wealth, would be too preoccupied to participate in the polis and fail to perform
their civic duties (Kozel, 2006, p. 25).
Aristotelian thought is continued and reflected in the Christian church
during the Middle Ages. Religion is combined with Aristotle’s ideas to influence
economic thought on usury during this time period. Citizens involved in trade
questioned whether profit was considered moral. They turned toward the Church
to address this problem. They looked at Jesus who had his followers give up all
their possessions (Backhouse, 2002, p.33). Saints were respected and followed,
yet not as extreme. Some Saints did not believe in owning property, because they
did not want people to become obsessed with the accumulation of it (Backhouse,
2002, p.34). This fixation with acquiring wealth has always been one main
argument against usury.
The Saints in the Christian church reflect Aristotle’s negative views on
wealth. St. Paul urged people to give up their worldly possessions (Madra, 2010,
Middle Ages). They would not have wealth and they would not be distracted with
the goal of accumulating money. St. Augustine argues that “wealth should be a
means not an end” (Madra, 2010, Middle Ages). St. Augustine is agreeing with
Aristotle that the natural exchange of money is deemed appropriate. People need
enough money as a “means” to survive. It should not be an “end” and the only
goal in one’s life.
The Church and the Saints supported a ban on usury by drawing from
Aristotle as well as from the Bible. The following biblical passage swayed many
Christians that usury was a sin.
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“But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing
again; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest:
He is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil” (Luke vi: 35, cited from Nelson,
1949, p.8).
When Christians heard the word of a disciple speak of lending but “hoping for
nothing”, they followed their example and adhered to it. The Church thus placed
a ban on usury for these religious and moral reasons.
The Crusades also posed an economic reason for the prohibition of lending
with interest. Usurers were seen as taking advantage of profits in “commodity
corners and loans on the security of lands” that had been placed on the market by
nobles gone to fight (Nelson, 1949, pg.7). With the elimination of these usurers,
these profits would then be directed toward the promotion of the crusades instead.
For efficient and influential promotion of the Crusades, several Popes required the
inhibition of usurers (Nelson, 1949, pg.7). Leading up to the Crusades, discussion
on the definition of a usurer had been unclear. The Popes then curtailed all usury
to solidify the distinction. These actions let it be clear that one of the motives
for the Crusades was the elimination of usury. The Crusades also experienced
much land being placed on the market by men fighting in the Holy Wars (Nelson,
1949, pg.7). Usurers then exploited the market, seeking profit from the absence of
these warriors. While Christianity opposed usury, Islam was seen holding similar
views.
The decline of the Roman Empire was followed by the growth of Islam.
The golden age of Islam continued to see religious and Aristotelian influences.
Muslims drew on these influences to develop their argument that usury was
morally and ethically wrong. The Prophet Muhammad argued that no interest
should be required in transactions (Madra, 2010, Middle Ages). Muhammad was
as admired and esteemed as Aristotle; and the ideas of the two men were revered.
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The Qur’an, similar to the Bible, contains passages advising against the
practice of usury. The Muslim word for excess when speaking of usury is riba. Riba
is defined as lending money for interest without any risk to the lender (Jones, 1989,
Islam and Usury). The following Qur’anic passage addresses the issue of riba.
“O you who believe! Eat no Riba (usury)” (Jones, 1989, cited from the
Qur’an, Al Imran 3:130).
The ethics explained in the Qur’an were not to be reconciled with. In addition
to the Qur’an, several Hadith were composed urging against the practice. The
Hadith are narrations written describing the words and actions of Muhammad to
provide them as a guide on how Muslims should lead their lives (Brown, 2009,
p.89).
Muslim scholars emphasize the “consumable nature” of money and how
it can lead to the distraction of an individual (Jones, 1989, Islam and Usury).
The Qur’anic passage supports this view and helps Muslims understand the
divine adverseness to usury. Muslims believe that God “permits trade yet forbids
usury” (Visser, 1998, Usury). In the market individuals can make a profit through
determination and efficiency in which a value-creating process occurs. While
interest is set, profit is susceptible to change. One must work to guarantee that
they receive profit, while with interest one knows the amount that they will receive
(Visser, 1998, Usury).
Many Muslims view usury as the exploitation of the poor.

Making

money by abusing an economic relationship with the poor is strongly urged
against. In Islamic society they have a Principle of Distributive Equity that its
economy aims to maintain (Visser, 1998, Usury). Usury prevents this equity from
being reached. Usury is viewed as making the wealthy more affluent, and the
poor more deprived.
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Usury is defined by many as a love for money. However, this passion
for wealth is only one defining aspect of usury. Many, including the Church and
philosophers, criticize usury not only because it is considered an act of greed,
but also because it is delineated by the negative morals that one exhibits when
one performs usury. Some philosophers and religious advisors disparage usury
because it is the act of taking advantage of others. It is a disruption on individuals
when they are consumed with the idea of making money, and they may neglect their
other duties to society and their families. In addition to greed, the consequences
on individuals due to partaking in usury are reasons in themselves to vilify the act.
Changing and Persisting Views on Usury
History has seen a great deal of change in society and the economy.
Throughout the world, expansion has occurred and markets have developed.
Change is inevitable and is seen every day. A decrease in the importance of
religion, the emergence of long-distance trade, and the development capitalism
has had an effect on many people’s views on usury.
In the West, an emanation of trade has posed new thoughts on individuals’
actions and decisions in the market. The decreasing importance of religion along
with decreasing government censorship contributed to more new economic ideas.
These emerging ideas influenced peoples’ shifting opinions on usury. In the West,
usury no longer carries a negative connotation and it is no longer viewed as a sin.
The world has evolved and trade has become more complex and
defined. In the current globalized world, making profit is present and abundant
in the economy.

Making profit off of others is seen in exchange between two

individuals and exchange on a global scale. Profit drives the market and keeps
society in motion. Although some disapprove of the practice, usury is now a
widely accepted social behavior.
103

Long-distance trade resulted in the creation of industries and
commercialism. These then led to towns to support these markets and merchant
capitalists became prominent (Hunt, 2002, p12). The number of people involved
in the market and in trade has increased. As this number became augmented,
people became to accept usury more.
The Church lifted its ban on usury around the 18th century as the
practice was widely debated.

No clear answer on its permittance was found.

One philosopher states that while religion has influenced most laws, such as
the Christian church and usury, its effects have gradually been “purged away
during the past two centuries so that today there is almost nothing is left of them”
(Berman, 1974, p.26).
Many view the crisis of religion being present in law as a result from the
decrease in self-identification with religion and the Church (Berman, 1974, p.95).
A society whose political and religious aspects have no principles of change is
believed by some to be a society in danger (Berman, 1974, p.139). As stated
previously, change is inevitable and societies must adjust to the evolving times.
As history unfolded, the Church came to realize that usury was
economically detrimental to itself. During the Middle Ages, monasteries that
existed were capable of lending money (Noonan, 2005, p.131). However, usury
was banned and therefore the monasteries did not participate in such practices.
As the twelfth century passed economists saw urban churches develop. These
churches were also available to lend money (Noonan, 2005, p.131). These
economic reasons, combined with an increase in long-distance trade and changing
ideas, contributed to the lifting of the usury ban.
The Enlightenment philosophers and the ideas of Adam Smith helped
influence a lifting on the ban of usury. In the past acting in one’s own “self104

interest” helped define usury. However, ideas such as Smith’s thoughts on
public good and on society shed new light on the debate. Self-interest is argued
to be congruent with a flourishing society. Smith’s Wealth of Nations describes
how a society can prosper even while individuals act in their own self interest
(Backhouse, 2002, p.123). While this is possible, he emphasizes that justice must
be present in order for society to function properly.
The emergence of capitalism and a free market changed the West’s view
on usury. Capitalism led to the break-up of medieval feudalism which was an
economic system that supported usury (Hunt, 2002, p.11). Privately owning
inputs for production and making a profit became more common and excepted.
Capitalism has many definitions, and many individuals began to define it as
“honest trade and entrepreneurialism” (Visser, 1998, Usury).
The influence of capitalism was seen as early as the Middle Ages. A
subtle shift towards accepting usury is present in loans during this time period.
Individuals involved in the market agreed that if the “lender shared in the risk of
the venture, the loan was legal” and it was not prohibited (Jones, 1989, Islam and
Usury). Laws prohibiting usury rarely intervened with commercial capitalism.
Merchants were able to receive a loan if their agreements made them susceptible
to risk as well (Jones, 1989, Islam and Usury).
As commercialism became more prominent, a pro-capitalism movement
developed in response to a pro-usury movement (Visser, 1998, Usury). The procapitalism movement certainly contained more momentum and support. Usury
gradually was changing from being viewed as a morally wrong act against others,
to being viewed as a more personal action which was not considered ethically
wrong.
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While the West experienced a major shift in its view on usury, Islam has
held fast to its negative connotation on the practice. It has developed with the
changing world, but ultimately Islam has not altered its view.
Many Muslims continue to view usury as detrimental to society.
Religiously, the Muslims adhere strictly to their sacred texts and the teachings of
their Prophets. They do not easily allow modern times to change their opinion on
their traditions. Concerning capitalism, the Islamic perspective speaks that “the
greatest problem in the capitalist economy is that of the crises and interest which
plays a peculiar part in bringing about the crises” (Visser, 1998, Usury).
The evolution of the market economy is unavoidable and the Muslims
are seen adjusting to it. To continue being an active participant in the developing
world, Muslims have established a new system of Islamic banks. These banks
do lend money, however they do not do so usuriously (Jones, 1989, Islam and
Usury). The banks are expected to share the risk concerning money with the
borrower. Agreements made between the borrower and lenders of the banks do
not entail a “predetermined amount over and above principle” (Jones, 1989, Islam
and Usury). Money must not be made from money.
In the 1960s, the first modern bank was created in Egypt, and the
consecutive three decades have seen great expansion of the system (Visser, 1998,
Usury).

By doing so, Muslims are attempting to make their national banks

function in accord with the teaching of Muhammad and the Qur’an. Muslims
claim that their system of banks provides a stable, equitable, and more lucrative,
system of lending (Visser, 1998, Usury).
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Conclusion
The debate over usury has been intriguing philosophers, economists, and
society for the past two millenniums. Countless religious, social, and economic
reasons are utilized to argue for and against the practice.
Beginning with ancient Greece around 300 B.C., Aristotle is seen
emerging with ideas opposing usury. His arguments of natural versus un-natural
trade influence people of his time as well as provide the foundation for future
arguments. An emphasis is placed on the importance of the Greek polis and the
citizens’ duty and involvement in it. He urges individuals not to be caught up in
greed and money making so that they will be able to fulfill their civic duties.
Christianity and Islam emerge during the Middle Ages and draw on
Aristotle’s teachings. Each respective religion also is seen reviewing sacred texts
to support a ban on usury. The Christian church and its Saints explain how usury
is morally wrong. They argue how one can be corrupted for exploiting others and
being consumed with making a profit. Islam draws on Muhammad’s teachings
and the Qur’an to prohibit usury. They argue for equity among all; and they frown
upon usury as it can take advantage of the poor.
Long-distance trade, capitalism, and a decrease on the emphasis of
religion appeared as time passed and the world evolved. More people became
involved in the markets and trade became more prominent. New ideas and
thoughts on usury emerged as it became a more common practice.
In the West, most of society accepts usury and no longer considers it a
sin or a socially unmoral practice. The decline in the importance of religion has
contributed to this. The sacred texts and the traditions of the Church have less
influence on individuals and their actions in the economy.
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Islam however has not experienced such a change of viewpoints on
usury. Muslims continue to see the practice as ethically wrong. In response to the
evolving world, modern Islamic banks have developed. These banks do not lend
money usuriously; and they were created so that all national banks will adhere to
Muslim religious law.
The teachings of Aristotle and the sacred texts of both Islam and
Christianity will always be available for discussion. Philosophers and economists
will draw from these to argue for and against the practice of lending money at
interest. While it is important to understand that usury will always be disputed,
it is also essential to comprehend that the world is susceptible to change and that
adjustments can be made accordingly.
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